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SPECIFIC RELIEF FOR ANCIENT
DEPRIVATIONS OF PROPERTY
Shelby D. Green∗
July 1998: “The Wiljen tribe in Western Australia staked a claim to
13.2 million square kilometres of Antarctica.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1795, the State of New York purchased more than 64,000 acres
of land from the Cayuga Indian Nation for roughly $2,000, plus a small
annual annuity.2 Two centuries later, a federal court would declare that
sale void because it violated a federal law.3 But what relief should be
granted? Rescission of contract? Ejectment of the current possessors?
Early in the litigation, the court ruled that specific relief, that is, the
return of the land, would not be granted, that the Cayuga would have to
accept instead a substitutionary relief, monetary compensation.4 Even
monetary compensation would prove a difficult calculation if 200 years
of interest would be added in. In all, the state was ordered to pay a sum
far greater than the meager original purchase price, indeed, more than a
quarter of a billion dollars.5 There will be more such reckonings in the
State of New York and nationwide,6 as the Oneida Indian Nation is also
∗
Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law, J.D. Georgetown University Law
Center, B.S. Towson State College.
1
“Aborigines Lay Claim to Antarctica,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, July 25, 1998, available
at http://www.lexis.com.
2
Cayuga Indian Nation of N. Y. v. Pataki, 165 F. Supp. 2d 266, 332 (N.D.N.Y. 2001). In
subsequent transactions, the State of New York acquired tribal lands for four shillings, or the
equivalent of fifty cents, per acre, which the state in turn sold by public auction at two dollars per
acre. Id. at 331.
3
Indian Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. §177 (2002).
4
Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo, Nos. 80-CV-930; 80-CV-960, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10579 (N.D.N.Y. June 30, 1999).
5
Cayuga Indian Nation, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 283. The amount awarded included $211
million as prejudgment interest. Id. at 366.
6
Through negotiated settlements since 1970, the United States has restored to Native
Americans more than a half billion acres of land. See Nell J. Newton, Compensation, Reparations,
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seeking to recover some 270,000 acres in two New York counties7 and
the Senecas are claiming title to some 19,000 acres making up the
Niagara Islands.8 Last year, to the probable, though perhaps short-lived,
relief of the State of Illinois and many individual landholders, the Miami
Tribe of Oklahoma voluntarily dismissed, without prejudice, a complaint
seeking to reclaim more than 2.6 million acres. They alleged that their
original and ancient title to the land continued after European
colonization because it was never extinguished by, nor ceded to, the
federal government.9 One of the largest land claims brought against the
federal government was won by the Sioux Nation in 1980 on the basis of
a claim that the Black Hills of South Dakota had been taken a century
earlier in breach of treaty.10 But the citizens of the Sioux Nation have
refused the monetary award, insisting instead on the return of the land.11
The claim to Antarctica seemed only the next logical assertion of
& Restitution: Indian Property Claims in the United States, 28 GA. L. REV. 453 (1994).
7
Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974) (“Oneida I”). This case
was first dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the complaint
essentially alleged a state claim to possession. Oneida Indian Nation v. Oneida, 464 F.2d 916 (2d
Cir. 1972). The Supreme Court reversed [in the cite above], holding that a claim to possession
based on Indian title presented a question of federal law. Oneida I, 414 U.S. at 682. On remand,
the district court held for the plaintiffs. Oneida Indian Nation v. Oneida, 434 F. Supp. 527, 548
(N.D.N.Y. 1977). The Second Circuit rejected defendants’ claims that there was no private right of
action under the Nonintercourse Act or an action at federal common law. Oneida Indian Nation v.
Oneida, 719 F.2d 525, 544 (2d Cir. 1983), aff’d, 470 U.S. 226. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and affirmed the Second Circuit in Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 253-54
(1985) (“Oneida II”). In September 2000, the district court denied the Oneida’s request for leave to
amend their complaint to add ejectment, Oneida Nation v. Oneida, 199 F.R.D. 61 (N.D.N.Y. 2000),
essentially on the ground that for most of the litigation, the Oneida had represented that they would
not seek ejectment, where they had not originally. Id. at 86.
8
Seneca Nation of Indians v. New York, 26 F. Supp. 2d 555 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). In Seneca
Nation of Indians v. New York, 206 F. Supp. 2d 448 (W.D.N.Y. 2002), the court rejected an attempt
by the Senecas to reclaim land consisting of the Niagara Islands that had been transferred in
violation of federal law by finding that their aboriginal title had been extinguished before the
alleged unlawful transfer. In Alabama-Coushatta Tribe v. United States, No. 3-83, 1996 U.S.
Claims LEXIS 128, at *265 (July 22, 1996), the court ruled that the government was liable to pay
full monetary compensation to the plaintiff tribe for breach of the government’s fiduciary duties in
failing to prevent the taking of the tribe’s aboriginal lands, some 3.5 million acres in southeastern
Texas. Id. The tribe had only sought monetary compensation and not the return of the land. Id. at
*269.
9
Miami Tribe v. Walden, 206 F.R.D. 238, 239 (S.D. Ill. 2001). Intervening on the side of
current possessors, Senator Peter G. Fitzgerald had introduced legislation to give aid to “certain
Illinois families and landowners seriously threatened” by the suit. Fitzgerald Bill Aids Illinois
Families Named in Indian Lawsuit, PR NEWSWIRE, July 25, 2000 available at
http://www.lexis.com.
10
United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
11
Sioux Nation is discussed further infra, at note 165 and accompanying text. The monetary
award remains in the federal treasury and stands at nearly half a billion dollars. See generally,
DAVID GETCHES ET. AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 361 (4th ed. 1998).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol36/iss2/2

2

Green: Specific Relief for Ancient Deprivations of Property
GREEN1.DOC

2003]

3/19/03 3:15 PM

SPECIFIC RELIEF FOR ANCIENT DEPRIVATIONS OF PROPERTY

247

title by Australian aboriginals, given their recent successes at reclaiming
title to native lands in Australia. Last year alone, they reclaimed more
than 90,000 square miles of land.12 As of July 2000, there were more
than 500 aboriginal land claims pending, covering half of the state’s
crown land.13
In the last two years, by negotiated treaty and settlement, Canada
has restored indigenous groups to hundreds of thousands of square miles
of aboriginal land, including “old-growth forests, beach fronts and
mountainsides” on beautiful Vancouver Island.14 The Nunavut
Agreement15 is the largest land claims agreement in the world, covering
some 350,000 square kilometres, including some 36,000 square
12
Roger Martin, Land title deal a bonanza for 500 Aborigines, AUSTRALASIAN BUSINESS
INTELLIGENCE, Oct. 17, 2000, available at 2000 WL 28459263. In October, 2000 “the Spinifex
people of Western Australia have won Australia’s largest land rights claim . . . [o]ver 50,000 square
kilometres of land in the Great Victoria Desert, . . . representing 85 per cent of their traditional
lands.” Id. In October 2000, a federal court “handed down [a] negotiated determination that [gave]
the Wik and Wik Way people exclusive rights [to] over 6,000 square kilometres of land and inland
waters on the Western edge of the Cape York Peninsula.” Cathy Pryor, New struggle looms after
Wik people win six-year land battle, AUSTRALASIAN BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE, Oct. 4, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 27948080. In August 2000, an agreement was reached on the “claim by the
Nganawongka for 48,000 kms of pastoral country south of the Pilbara. The claim gave access to
pastoral leases for hunting, fishing and other non-commercial purposes and compensation for
mining.” Ron Brunton, Landmark native title agreement an eye-opener, AUSTRALASIAN BUSINESS
INTELLIGENCE, Dec. 9, 2000, available at http://www.lexis.com. In August 2000, a federal court in
Perth, granted “native title” over an area of 47,607 square kilometres in Western Australia’s
Murchison-Gascoyne region, restoring to them “native title” rights over it, which included the right
to hunt, fish and gather.
13
There were 194 claims in Queensland, 141 in Western Australia, 86 in New South Wales,
67 in the Northern Territory, 26 in South Australia, 21 in Victoria, three in the Australian Capital
Territory, and none in Tasmania). It was reported that such native title claims were costing the
Victoria government some $3 million a year. AAP Information Services, Pty. Ltd. Nationwide
General News, Australian General News, “Vic: Native Title Claim Costs Hit $3 million Per Year.”
June 4, 1999, available at http://www.lexis.com. In an examination of recent statistics regarding
land claims, one writer estimated that Aborigines have potential claims to seventy-nine percent of
Australia’s land. Gilda C. Rodriguez, Note, Wik Peoples v. State of Queensland: A Restrained
Expansion of Aboriginal Land Rights, 23 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 711, 724 (1998).
14
Anthony DePalma, Canada and British Columbia’s Largest Indian Group Taking Steps to
First Permanent Treaty”, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001. In March 2001, Canada and British
Columbia’s largest Indian group, the Nuu-chah-nulth, entered into a historic treaty that gave the
Indians self-rule, $152 million and shared control with non-Indians over almost 260 square miles.
Id. In June 2000, Canada agreed to pay the indigenous Squamish Nation “$92.5 million to settle
claims to former reserves in Vancouver, North Vancouver and Squamish.” “Ottawa pays B. C.
Band $92.5 to settle claims to former reserves [Squamish], CANADIAN BUSINESS AND CURRENT
AFFAIRS, June 9, 2000.
15
The agreement was signed on May 25, 1993, forming the Agreement Between the Inuit of
the Nunavut Settlement Area and Her Majesty the Queen in the Right of Canada. Nunarut Land
Claims Agreement Act, ch. 29, S.C. 1993 (Can). The federal implementation legislation is Nunavut
Land Claims Agreement Act, ch.29, S.C. 1993 (Can.). It received royal assent on June 10, 1993 and
became effective by order in council on July 9, 1993. Id.
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kilometres with subsurface rights and exclusive or preferential game
rights to particular species of wildlife, and monetary compensation of
more than a billion dollars payable over 14 years.16
In these cases, there are the broad claims for the return of ancestral
lands. There are also the more narrow ones for specific rights, such as to
fish, hunt, mine, forest, and whale, as these are thought to inhere in title
in the western conception of ownership and are said to be an aspect of
aboriginal title that can be exercised unconnected to a specific parcel of
land. There have even been claims to water as a species of aboriginal
rights.17
In virtually all of these cases, both the rights and the claims being
asserted are ancient. The rights are ancient in the formal sense of being
pre-modern and founded upon or grounded in ancient, common, or
customary law. The claims are ancient in the formal sense of having
arisen in antiquity or centuries ago when the taking or dispossession
occurred.18 They are also ancient in the legal sense of otherwise being
subject to or barred by statutes of limitations. But as the recounted
successes show, the rights and claims, though ancient, are yet viable and
qualify for relief under prevailing property law theory.
Nations have responded variously to these claims, by establishing
land claims commissions to acquire land from current possessors for the
return to indigenous peoples,19 adopting constitutional amendments to
16
As part of the agreement, the federal government committed itself to a process to create
the new territory of Nunavut on April 1, 1999.
17
In the Philippines, claims for the restoration of “ancestral domain,” have included
ancestral lands, forests, inland waters, coastal areas, natural resources and land for traditional access
used by the groups for their subsistence and traditional activities. Luz Rimban, Philipines: Legal
Claim Opens Doors for Indigenous Islanders, INTER PRESS Service, Oct. 1, 1988, available at
http://www.lexis.com; The indigenous Tagbanua people established title not only to more than
22,000 hectares of land, but also to ancestral waters, the blue-green waters of the Coron Island in
the Palawan province in central Philippines. Id. In Yarmirr v. Northern Territory, 2001 Aust. High
Ct LEXIS 51 (Oct. 11, 2001), the Australian High Court rejected a claim by aboriginals to the seas
and seabeds contained within aboriginal areas, including reefs, on the ground that under common
law, an exclusive right to waters in individuals was inconsistent with the public right to navigate and
to fish the waters. Id. at *90, *94.
18
In the Republic of South Africa, as of 1998, some 64,000 land claims had been lodged
under the Restitution of Land Rights Act of 1994 for the return of land taken from black South
Africans under the apartheid regime. Peter Wilhelm, “Rolling of Huge Boulder Begins to Gain
Pace * Land Restitution”, FINANCIAL MAIL, May 14, 1999, available at http://www.lexis.com.
19
E.g., Philipines—The Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997, Republic Act No. 8371
(1997). (Since 1994, the Philippines’ environment department has awarded well over a hundred
“Certificates of Ancestral Domain Claim”); Brazil—National Land Reform and Colonization
Institute in Brasilia; Malaysia—(Some 30,000 applications per year have been filed to resolve
ancestral land issues). See A. Yogeshwary, Increase in number of ancestral land cases, NEW
STRAITS TIMES, Mar. 24, 2001. Since 1974, 600,000 of such cases have been resolved. Id.; See
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protect aboriginal rights and provide for compensation in case of a
taking of native lands,20 enacting land rights acts that declare and define
indigenous land rights,21 negotiating settlements,22 and entering into
treaties.23 Many aboriginal rights claims in the United States are being
prosecuted in the courts.24
Indigenous peoples in North America and Australia state a claim
even though their interest in the soil first occupied by them was not
formally recognized as a “property” interest until centuries after the
coming of the Europeans. For centuries after that, it was difficult to
discern a coherent theory of their aboriginal title. Aboriginal title or
“original Indian title,” as it is referred to in the United States, is not fee
simple title with all the usual empowering incidents.
By the
presumption of European sovereignty, aboriginal title is an inalienable
right of occupancy, liable to extinguishment by the national sovereign,
but immune from many of the burdens of fee simple title, such as state
taxation and state powers of eminent domain. But why is aboriginal title
so limited and vulnerable to sovereign prerogative while fee simple title
is not? The difference between these types of title is not organic or
intrinsic, that is, appertaining to the nature of the thing over which the
claimant asserts rights.25 In fact, aboriginal title has only to do with who
also, Zimbabwe—The Land Acquisition Act of 1992 (Zimbabwe); Chile—Corporacion Nacional de
Desarrollo Indigena (“Conadi”) (six years ago in Chile, the government has begun the process of
acquiring ancestral lands for the eventual conveyance to indigenous communities. See “Rights
Claims in Chile,” Nov. 22, 1999, by Gustavo Gonzalez).
20
CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) (Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada), §
35(1); In the Republic of South Africa, the newly-adopted Constitution provides for government
expropriation of private property so long as it is in accordance with law (E.g., for public purposes or
in the public interest) and subject to compensation. S. AFR. CONST. (1996) ch.II (Bill of Rights), §
25. The Constitution also provides for legislative action to implement land reform. Id. Under
Section 25(7), “[a] person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 [Native Land
Act of 1913] as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent
provided by an Act of Parliament, either to restitution of that property or to equitable redress.” Id. §
25(7). Section 25(6) provides that “[a] person or community whose tenure of land is legally
insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided
by an Act of Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure, or to comparable redress.” Id. at §
25(6). The Lands Claim Court was established in 1996 and hears claims from the Commission on
the Restitution of Land Rights, which mediates land claims arising from the forced removals after
the enactment of the 1913 Act. If mediation fails to successfully resolve a claim, it is referred to the
Land Claims Court for adjudication. Among other things, the Land Claims Court can order
restitution to successful claimants in the form of land or other remedies, for which the state bears
the burden of compensation.
21
Native Title Act of 1993 (Austl.) (establishing the National Native Title Tribunal).
22
See discussion supra note 13 and accompanying text.
23
See discussion supra note 14 and accompanying text.
24
See cases mentioned at text accompanying notes 7 through 9.
25
There are numerous instances in the Western concept of property where whether there is
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its original holders are. It can only exist in indigenous peoples as a
group, but cannot be created in them from fee simple title. Aboriginal
title is title that was so designated and excluded from the common law
property system. While a system evolved to mark the contours and
dimensions of fee simple title and to provide remedies for its fulfillment,
that system generally was not available to holders of aboriginal title and
no other system or scheme was quick to emerge to remedy infringements
of aboriginal rights. For centuries, aboriginal claimants were left to
appeal to the mercy of courts of equity and the grace of Congress for
protection and redress of infringements.26 But as the claims have found
legal forums and as indigenous peoples have found political clout, the
challenge for the courts has been to fashion just remedies for
infringements to a kind of right that is of a wholly different order, and
where the protection of which presents ancientness never allowed in the
case of fee simple title.
I consider in this paper the extent to which courts rationally and on
a principled basis can deny to aboriginal claimants, despite the
ancientness of their claims, the specific relief of being restored to
possession of their aboriginal lands where the case for such specific
relief is otherwise made. The paper begins with a brief discussion of the
foundations of property in the Western conception, then goes on to
discuss the Europeans’ asserted title to indigenous lands and the various
theories of aboriginal title that have emerged. It then explores the past
and existing legal obstacles to the judicial resolution of the indigenous
peoples’ claims and concludes with the proposition that unless the
federal government intervenes to create new sovereign territory in
substitution of aboriginal lands, specific relief is compelled. That is to
say, the only just and legally sustainable substitutionary relief is
substitute land. The paper’s main focus is on aboriginal land claims in
the United States, with some discussion of claims in Canada and
Australia.
II. FIRST POSSESSION AND PROPERTY IN THE COMMON LAW
Foremost in the Western European canon is that property resulted

property or not depends on the character of the things in which property rights are sought. Claims
to property in human body parts have been resisted. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Ca., 793 P.2d
479 (Cal. 1990). One state has declared elk not eligible for private ownership (Wyoming) and no
one can monopolize ideas. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (West 2002); WYO. STAT. ANN
§ 23-1-103 (West, WESTLAW through 2002 Legis. Sess.).
26
See discussion infra.
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from first possession.27 According to Blackstone “occupancy is the thing
by which . . . title was in fact originally gained; every man seizing . . .
such spots of ground as he found most agreeable to his own
convenience, provided he found them unoccupied by any one else.”28 It
is a theory that is venerable and persistent, dating back to Roman law.29
While Blackstone’s articulation has in the forefront notions of
territoriality and might, others have proposed that private property was
necessitated by scarcity, that is, as consumption in common led to the
scarcity of the natural riches of the earth, private property became
necessary to preserve peace.30 Through explicit agreement and
agreement implied by occupation, it became understood that whatever a
person had taken possession of should be that person’s property.31
John Locke built upon the first possession theory by incorporating
aspects of natural law. He posited that property resulted from mixing
one’s labor with objects belonging to no one.32 This is because, as a
principle of natural law, we indisputably “own” ourselves and, by
extension, everything we produce.33 Self-preservation thus required the

27

See Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 73-88

(1985).
28
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *8-9. This was so
by the law of nature and reason that in the beginning, “he, who first began to use it, acquired therein
a kind of transient property, that lasted so long as he was using it, and no longer: or, to speak with
greater precision, the right of possession continued for the some time only that the act of possession
lasted.” Id. at *2-3. It later “became necessary to entertain conceptions of more permanent
dominion; and to appropriate to individuals not the immediately use only, but the very substance of
the thing to be used. Otherwise innumerable tumults must have arisen, and the good order of the
world been continually broken and disturbed, while a variety of persons were striving who should
get the first occupation of the same thing, or disputing which of them had actually gained it. . . .”
Id. at 4.
29
LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 49 (1977).
30
BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 8.
31
JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 14 (Little, Brown & Co. Ltd. (3d ed.
1993); see also RICHARD SCHLATTER, PRIVATE PROPERTY: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 130-31
(1951). “Despite its persistence, the normative case for first possession—its force as a
justification—is commonly thought to be rather weak.” Dukeminier at 15. Other equally logical
bases for property include need, on the one hand, and efficiency on another. There is also the
rationale of social utility. For a general discussion of the theories of property, see Jeremy Waldron,
What is Private Property?, 5 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 313, 318 (1985); Becker, supra note 29;
STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY (1990); JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1988).
32
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 20 (Prometheus Books 1986)
(1690).
33
Id. at 22. Locke’s theory has been described as “a philosophy of property that justif[ied]
private ownership not as a means for capitalist accumulation but as a means for withstanding the
abuse of authority by government.” Bradley Bryan, Property as Ontology: On Aboriginal and
English Understandings of Ownership, 13 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 3, 10-11 (2000).
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recognition and protection of those things thus resulting from one’s labor
and one’s dominion.34 According to Hume, rules of property are
conventions that have evolved spontaneously, arisen gradually and
acquired force by slow progression and repeated experience.35
One modern conception of property, “conflates [it] with wealth, or
rather, with . . . ‘goods’ and ‘items of consumption.’”36 Property as such
has lost its distinct moral difference such that the idea of ‘use’ (acts of
dominion or adding labor) as fundamental, is now based primarily in its
exchange value.37 Even though the avowed meaning of property is the
right that characterizes a particular relationship between an individual
and the rest of society, the varieties of relationships have increasingly
become transactional in nature. In this sense, the social relationships
and moral understandings that had previously undergirded property
theory have since been rationalized and structured according to the
demands of production.38
The homily of the common law, though, is that possession is the
root of title.39 But what does it mean to possess? Posession includes a
clear act, some sort of statement, or a declaration of one’s intent to
appropriate. That act must give notice to the world that the possessor
has appropriated the property.40 Professor Rose writes that the requisite
34
Locke offered his theory of property before the industrial revolution. In the views of one
scholar, “[t]he kinds of changes that happen[ed] in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, properly
understood, alter[ed] the nature of property rights through their application to industrial enterprise,
and hence can be best understood through the analysis of the development of contract law and of the
law of remedies for trespass.” Id. at 12. Property thus acquires an exchange value. Id.
Such a transformation in English property law speaks volumes of how we understand our
own relationship to the natural world. Specifically, what something is is not determined
by who owns it but rather by what it is worth. This is reflected in the modern practice of
property law: as property is really (crudely) a bundle of rights, these rights reflect the
abilities one has with respect to what one can do with one’s property, and usually this is
reflected in contractual or succession arrangements of one sort or another . . . . The ‘use’
value of a thing disappears because property becomes understood in terms for which it
can be bargained, i.e., in contract.
Id. at 12-13.
35
2 DAVID HUME, TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE 273-84 (T.H. Green & T.H. Grose eds.,
London, Longmans, Green & Co. 1874).
36
Bryan, supra note 33, at 14.
37
Id.
38
Id. As we discuss infra, however, aboriginal title, since it cannot be voluntarily
exchanged, continues to have only “use” value.
39
“Occupancy has long been regarded as the basis for original title to territory by the law of
nature, and hence in international law.” KENT MCNEIL, COMMON LAW ABORIGINAL TITLE 135
(1989); A.W. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW (Clarendon Press, 1986); Rosalie Schaffer,
International law and sovereign rights of indigenous peoples, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
ABORIGINAL HUMAN RIGHTS 19-42 (Barbara Hocking, ed., 2d. 1988).’’
40
See generally, I. F. Pollock & R.S. Wright, An Essay on Possession in the Common Law
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act must make a statement, meaning that “acts of possession” are a
“text,” and “the common law rewards the author of that text.”41 But the
clearest text may have ambiguous subjects and it is inevitable that the
interpretation and meaning of “text” and “subjects” will be read
differently by different audiences and depending upon the readers’
ultimate objectives or interests.42 There is also the doubtful proposition
that “there is such a thing as a ‘clear act,’ unequivocally proclaiming” to
the world at large that one is appropriating that any relevant audience
will naturally and easily interpret as a property claim.”43 Yet in defining
the acts of possession that makeup a claim to property, the law not only
rewards the author of the “text;” it also puts an imprimatur on a
particular symbolic system and on the audience that uses this system.44
III. INVENTIONS AND FICTIONS FOR TITLE
Henry Maine defined “fiction” in law as “any assumption which
conceals or affects to conceal, the fact that a rule of law has undergone
alteration, its letter remaining unchanged, its operation being
modified.”45 In the workings of the law, fictions serve to introduce
change behind the facade of adherence to existing law.46 Lon Fuller
wrote of several motivations behind the use of fictions: First, policy, that
is, to conceal something from others, particularly that judges do not
make law, but only declare what has always been law;47 second,
emotional conservatism, that is, as a way of satisfying the judge’s own
craving for certainty and stability; third, convenience, by making use of
existing legal institutions by pretending that certain facts exists; and
fourth, intellectual conservatism, where the judge does not know how
else to state and explain the new principle he is applying.48 Fuller
explained that legal fiction probably owes it origin “not so much to a

16 (1888) (“possession in law” is “the fact of control coupled with a legal claim and right to
exercise it in one’s own name against the world at large, . . . not as against all men without
exception.”)
41
Rose, supra note 27, at 82.
42
Id. at 83. Rose states: “[But] it is not always easy to establish a symbolic structure in
which the text of first possession can be ‘published’. . . Some objects of property claims [indeed]
seem inherently incapable of clear demarcation [altogether]—ideas, for example. [note omitted].”
Id.
43
Id. at 84.
44
Id. at 85.
45
HENRY S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 25 (4th ed. 1906).
46
DIAS, supra note 47, at 318; R.W. DIAS, JURISPRUDENCE, 408 (2d ed. 1964).
47
DIAS at 319, citing MAINE at 38. See generally, DIAS, supra note 47, at 407-15.
48
LON L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 52 (1968).
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superstitious disrelish for change or some instinct for self-deceit, as to an
impulse toward harmony and system. By giving to the new law the
verbal form of the old it facilitated its absorption into the existing corpus
of rules.”49
The enlarged concept of terra nullius,50 that lands inhabited by
“backward peoples,” were vacant and occupied by no one was a fiction,
although not one that can be said to serve any of the ends identified by
Fuller and others. In any other setting, the indigenous peoples’
occupation of their lands would have been seen as “statements” or
“texts” that could be understood and their prior claims to the land then
taken seriously. Instead, Europeans declared indigenous lands that were
in fact occupied, nonetheless open to their “discovery.”51 This fiction
enabled the European “discoverers” to disregard the customary rights of
the indigenous inhabitants in a way that appeared consistent with
international law.52
49

Id.
The general concept refers to a thing or territory belonging to no one. BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1483 (7th ed. 1999).
51
Bryan, supra note 33, at 4-5. Professor Bryan asserts that:
[T]o answer the claim of terra nullius, on its own terms, is dangerous because it redescribes Aboriginal relationships to land as ‘occupation,’ ‘possession,’ and ‘property.’
We fall into the language and logic used by many legal practitioners and anthropologists
who describe images of an Aboriginal past marred by its barbarism because we take on
the categories of what will count as civilization—property being one of these. . . . [T]o
re-describe native reality is to actually change native reality: changed descriptions create
new webs of meaning, and hence practices, identity, and worldviews will all be affected.
Id.
52
Professor McNeil explains:
At the dawn of the colonial era towards the end of the fifteenth century, there were no set
rules for the acquisition of territories which were not already within the jurisdiction of
the recognized sovereign. The European powers sought to fortify shaky claims by
whatever means they could, including assertions of discovery, symbolic acts of
possession, papal bulls, the signing of treaties with rival States or local chiefs and
princes, the establishment of settlements, and outright conquest by force of arms. . . .
[The] practical [effect] . . . [was] that a sovereign who succeeded in exercising a
sufficient degree of exclusive control was generally regarded as having acquired
sovereignty.
MCNEIL, supra note 39, at 110. It thus became a rule that acquisition of sovereignty over terra
nullius depend[ed] on effective occupation.” Id.; see also MARK F. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION
AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEING A TREATISE ON
THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO COLONIAL EXPANSION (Negro Univ. Press 1969) (1926);
Eric Kades, History and Interpretation of the Great Case of Johnson v. M’Intosh, 19 LAW &
HISTORY REV. 67, 71 (2001). In any case, the discovery rule did not dictate what rule determined
the rights of the sovereign vis-a-vis the natives. The French permitted their colonists to purchase
directly from the Indians. Id. In the United States, some early settlers simply declared that the
Indians had no rights to their own lands, largely on account of, in the eyes of the Europeans, the
Indians’ non-European styled civilization. Id. at 72.
50
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What the law of England and international law otherwise required
was recognition of title in the indigenous peoples. The theory was that
the moment sovereignty was acquired over a vacant territory, the Crown
became “seised in demesne”53 of all lands, and remained so until it
granted them out,54 but the pre-sovereignty rights of the indigenous
people were not extinguished by the acquisition of sovereignty alone.
Under the doctrine of continuity, there was a “presumption that in the
absence of express confiscation or expropriatory legislation, those rights
[held under local laws] would continue after a change in sovereignty.”55
The rights allowed and preserved to the indigenous peoples depended,
however, upon a classification of territories, which determined the law in
force in the territory.56 In conquered and ceded territories [those
acquired by war or treaty] local laws and customs, in so far as they were
not unconscionable or incompatible with the change in sovereignty,
remained in force until altered or replaced by the Crown.”57 The “public
property rights held by [the former ruler] would generally pass to the
Crown along with sovereignty.”58 As for private property, the Crown
would have an absolute power at the time of conquest or cession to
seize, and thus acquire title to, both lands and chattel.”59 Where the
Crown chose to do so, private persons who were deprived of their
property in this way would have no remedy because the seizure would
be an act of state, that is an act of sovereign power which is outside the
jurisdiction of the courts.60 However, once the Crown accepted the
territory into its dominions, the subjects of the former sovereign would
be British subjects, and as a result, the Crown’s power to deal with them
53
The feudalistic concept of “seisin” meant the right of possession and also the burdens of
delivering up feudal services to the overlord. See S.F. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE
COMMON LAW 118-19 (1969).
54
MCNEIL, supra note 39, at 135.
55
Id. at 161; Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 30-31 (1947). In
contrast, under the recognition doctrine, it is said that only such rights as the Crown deigned to
recognize would be enforceable under the new regime. Id. McNeil believes that only the doctrine
of continuity is historically supportable. MCNEIL, supra note 39, at 177. For example, on October
7, 1763, soon after the Treaty of Paris was signed and the English Crown acquired sovereignty of
certain parts of Canada, “a Royal Proclamation was issued which, among other things, ‘for the
present’ reserved certain lands to the nations or tribes of Indians who were connected with and
living under the protection of the Crown, and prohibited colonial governors from granting warrants
of survey or issuing patents for, and private persons from settling on or purchasing, those lands.”
Id. at 270. This meant that whatever rights the Indians had under the French had survived. Id.
56
Id. at 113.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 117.
59
Id. at 162.
60
Id. at 162-63.
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and their property by act of state would be at an end.61 The Crown
“none the less retain[ed] prerogative legislative powers by virtue of
which it could extinguish property rights,” but with compensation.62
“In settled territories, English law accompanied the colonists to the
extent it was applicable to the local circumstances.”63 Where such
territories had indigenous populations, the importation of English law
“did not necessarily abrogate pre-existing customary law,” but the extent
to which English law was introduced and local law retained, varied with
the circumstances.64 What is important is that the mere act of settling did
not have the effect of vesting title in the sovereign.65 As a general
matter, English law did not apply to regulate the internal affairs of
indigenous people who had their own systems of law.66 At the same
time, though, indigenous people would be protected by English law.67
Thus, “if a settler—or even the Crown—attempted to justify seizure of
lands occupied by [aboriginals] from pre-settlement times on the
grounds that [indigenous] laws gave them no title,” English law would
have given the aboriginals a remedy to fill the gap.68 If the territory did
not have a customary system of real property law, English law would
apply to give them a “common law aboriginal title.”69
It was the case then that customary law was the source of
indigenous rights in both conquered and ceded territories and settled
territories.70 Customary law is generally a matter of fact, but it has
proven difficult in the case of cultures with oral traditions and where the
evaluation is Eurocentric.71 Possession under English law could ground
title in the indigenous peoples. But because possession is a conclusion
of law, it could not exist apart from a legal system. Accordingly,
indigenous peoples who were not known to have had a system of law
could not be said to have been in possession. They could, however, have
61

Id. at 163-64.
Id. at 164.
63
MCNEIL, supra note 39, at 114.
64
Id. at 115-16.
65
Id. at 179; Cohen, supra note 53, at 31-32.
66
MCNEIL, supra note 38, at 182. “However, as British subjects and residents of one of the
Crown’s dominions, in general [indigenous peoples] would have to respect English public law,
especially law relating to serious crimes.” Id.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 183.
69
Id. at 183, 207-08.
70
Id. at 161, 193.
71
Id. at 193, 195. The indigenous peoples’ conception of land was not as a commodity that
could be owned, but more as something of “a sacred provider, to be used with respect bordering on
reverence.” Id. at 194.
62
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been in occupation, because that is a matter of fact, which does not
depend on the existence of law.72 Thus, if they were in occupation,
English law would accord them possession in the absence of proof that
possession was in another.73 The legal effect of this is that they would
have been presumed to have been in possession, which would mean
presumptive title and the right to defend against dispossession.74 This
presumptive title at the moment a territory was acquired by settlement,
would have given rise to common law aboriginal title.75 “Unless
rebutted, it would be as effectual to defend or recover possession as a
valid title by limitation, descent or purchase” and “would cover all lands
occupied,” including the subsurface (except precious minerals, which by
prerogative right belonged to the Crown) and “would entitle indigenous
possessors to fee simple estates, for possession.”76 As the history
reveals, however, it was the fiction and not the theory that held in North
America and Australia.
A. Variations on Aboriginal Title in Three Nations: Canada, Australia
and the United States
When the English Crown asserted sovereignty over lands in what is
now Canada, the aboriginal people became English subjects and entitled
to rights, including the possession of their lands, but not fee simple
title.77 In 1763, the Royal Proclamation by the English King George III
“acknowledged the aboriginal people as “nations or tribes,” and . . .
recognized that they continued to possess their traditional territories until
they [were] “ceded to or purchased by the Crown.”78 The Canadian
72

Id. at 196-97.
Id. at 197. The acts of occupation that should have been sufficient included the erection
of permanent dwellings and other structures, cultivation of lands, identification of definite tracts
over which domestic animals were herded and the occupation of land to which they resorted on a
regular basis to hunt, fish, or collect the natural products of the earth. Even outlying areas that were
visited occasionally and regarded as being under their exclusive control and lands over which socalled “hunters and gathers” passed should have been deemed in possession of the indigenous
people. Modern anthropological evidence is that few were indiscriminate wanderers, but tended to
be attached to definite areas where they often had spiritual ties. MCNEIL, supra note 39, at 201-03.
74
Id. at 207.
75
Id. at 207-08.
76
Id. at 208. In the United States, the term used is “original Indian title” and in Australia, it
is “native title.” For convenience in this introduction to the concept, the single term, “aboriginal
title” will be used. The variations occurring among nations are discussed later.
77
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (Can.).; Fred R. Fenwick,
“Unresolved aboriginal land claims in British Columbia,” Law Now, January 1999, available at
http://www.lexis.com.
78
Fenwick, supra note 77. “Nearly one-third [of the text of the Royal Proclamation of
1763] is devoted to British relations with Indigenous Nations, many of whom were allied with the
73
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Supreme Court has since declared that the Proclamation pronounced
assurances to aboriginals, but that is not the source of aboriginal title.
Instead, aboriginal title is a legal right that pre-existed European contact
and which did not need government recognition to exist.79
The 1997 decision in Delgamuukw v. Province of British
Columbia,80 is the seminal case on the nature and scope of aboriginal
title in Canada. As a foundational principle, the Court explained that
“aboriginal title encompasses the right to exclusive use and occupation
of the land held pursuant to that title.”81 That exclusive right gives the
British victors, referring to the Indigenous Peoples as “Nations,” as distinct societies with their own
forms of political organization with whom treaties had to be negotiated. It also enshrin[ed]
protection of Indigenous lands by the British Crown, and a process for seeking Indigenous consent
through a treaty process to allow for European settlement.” Id. at 8-9. It also spelled out that
indigenous nations had an inalienable right to their lands. Id. It was a codification of the norms of
customary international law for the Crown to enter into treaties with indigenous nations in the
Americas.
SHARON H. VENNE, OUR ELDERS UNDERSTAND OUR RIGHTS: EVOLVING
INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING INDIGENOUS RIGHTS 8 (1998).
79
Calder v. Attorney-Gen. of B. C., [1973] S.C.R. 313 (Can.).
80
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010. There, appellants claimed 58,000 square kilometres in British
Columbia, to which the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en (who together are some 5,500 to 7,000 members)
claimed aboriginal title. Id. at 1028-29. But the claimed land was occupied also by some 30,000
non-aboriginals. Id. at 1029. British Columbia “counterclaimed for a declaration that the appellants
have no right or interest in and to the territory or alternatively, that the appellants’ cause of action
ought to be for compensation from the Government of Canada.” Id. The trial court denied the
complaint and the Supreme Court reversed and ordered a new trial. Id. at 1028. The Court stated
that the factual findings made at trial could not stand because of the trial judge’s rejection of various
kinds of oral histories which were offered in an attempt to establish occupation and use of the
disputed territory, an essential requirement for aboriginal title. Id. at 1079. Had the oral histories
been correctly assessed, the conclusions on these issues of fact might have been different. Id.
81
Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1083. To establish a claim to aboriginal title, the group
asserting the claim must demonstrate that its ancestors had exclusive occupation of the lands at the
time the Crown asserted sovereignty. Id. at 1097-98, 1104. Occupation can be established by the
construction of dwellings, through the cultivation and enclosure of fields, by the regular use of
definite tracts for hunting, fishing or by otherwise exploiting the land’s resources. Id. at 1101. In
determining whether such occupation is sufficient to ground title, the group’s size, manner of life,
material resources, technological abilities, and the character of the lands claimed must be taken into
account as well as both the common law and the aboriginal perspective on land are considered. Id.
at 1101 (relying on R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (Can.)). The Court ruled that “the ‘key’
factors for recognizing aboriginal rights were met: 1) the nature of an aboriginal claim was
identified precisely with regard to particular practices, customs and traditions; 2) the aboriginal
society specified the area that had been continuously used and occupied by identifying general
boundaries; 3) the aboriginal right of possession was based on the continued occupation and use of
traditional tribal lands since the assertion of Crown sovereignty (although the date of sovereignty is
not the only relevant time to consider as continuity could still exist where the present occupation of
one area is connected to the pre-sovereignty occupation of another area and present occupation may
be proof of prior occupation and it is not necessary to establish an unbroken chain of continuity); 4)
the aboriginal peoples continued to occupy and use the land as part of their traditional way of life,
the land being of central significance to them. Delgamuukw [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1128-31. Whether
aboriginal rights are proprietary or usufructary in nature was not made entirely clear in
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right to engage in specific activities that are aspects of aboriginal
practices, customs and traditions integral to the claimant group’s
distinctive aboriginal culture,82 as well as the right to use the land in
ways that meet current needs and aspirations.83 Leaving no doubt, the
Court declared that “the law of aboriginal title does not only seek to
determine the historic rights of aboriginal peoples to land,” but also “to
afford legal protection to prior occupation in the present day.”84 Implicit
in this is a recognition of the importance of the continuity of the
relationship of an aboriginal community to its land over time.
Nonetheless, the Court said, those uses must not be irreconcilable with
the nature of the attachment to the land which forms the basis of the
group’s aboriginal title.85
This grounding of aboriginal title in historic occupation by
reference to traditional activities and uses marks it as sui generis and so
distinguished from fee simple title.86 So standing apart, aboriginal title
is inalienable, except to the Crown. It can only be held communally. If
lands covered by aboriginal title are used in a way that sui generis title
does not permit, they must be surrendered and the lands converted into
non-title lands.87
Aboriginal title, by the gross demarcations laid out in Delgamuukw
that nonetheless provide a kind of template, have since been held to
include the right of self-governance. In Campbell v. British Columbia,88
there was a constitutional challenge to certain provisions of the Nisga’a
treaty that purported to give the Nisga’a the right of self-governance
within their territory.89 The court identified three critical points in
Delgamuukw. Before that decision, these rights were long thought to be essentially usufructary in
nature. See, St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen, 14 App. Cas. 46 at 54 (1889).
Some language in the decision, though, can be read to conclude that the rights are proprietary in
nature, more like fee simple ownership. Id.
82
Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1080-81.
83
Id. at 1083-85; Cf. Guerin v. Canada, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 (Can.) (declaring the aboriginal
interest in reserve and aboriginal title lands as the same and that the right to occupy is not qualified
by reference to traditional and customary uses of those lands). “[A]boriginal title encompass[es]
mineral rights and lands held pursuant to aboriginal title should be capable of exploitation. . . .”
Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1015.
84
Id. at 1088.
85
Id. at 1080, 1088.
86
Id. at 1080-81.
87
Id. at 1081-83.
88
[2000] 189 D.L.R. (4th) 333, 2000 C.R.D.J. LEXIS 310.
89
Id. The challengers argued that inasmuch as the constitution had distributed all legislative
power to Parliament, no legislative power could be recognized in any other body. Id. at 10. It was
undisputed that long before the arrival of the Europeans, the Nisga’a occupied substantial areas in
British Columbia and had identifiable cultural traditions, their own language, territories and legal
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Delgamuukw that required the finding of a right of self-governance: 1)
“aboriginal title originates in part from pre-existing systems of
aboriginal law;” 2) Section 35 (1) of the Constitution provides protection
to aboriginal rights “in its full form”; and 3) “aboriginal title
encompasses within it a right to choose to what ends a piece of land can
be put.” 90 The court drew from this that as aboriginal title in its full
form gives the right to make decisions about the use of the land, there is
a right to a political structure for making those decisions.91
While these aboriginal rights are different from other common law
rights, particularly in that they do not derive from or take their meaning
solely from Western philosophies,92 the Supreme Court has emphasized
that their essence is the bridging of aboriginal and non-aboriginal
cultures, that they are a “form of intersocietal” law that evolved from
long-standing practices linking the various communities.93 This sui
generis characterization may mean that the extent to which indigenous
peoples are entitled to be restored to land wrongfully taken should not be
systems. Id. at *38-39. They were recognized as political communities, with the power to make
laws in the constitutional sense. Id. at *39-40, ¶ 106-107.
90
Id. at *62, ¶ 154.
91
Id. at *63-64, ¶ 157, *62, ¶ 154, citing Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1088. In
December 1995, the Canadian federal government published a policy statement entitled Aboriginal
Self-Government: The Government of Canada’s Approach to Implementation of the Inherent Right
and the Negotiation of Aboriginal Self-Government. It stated, inter alia: “The Government of
Canada recognizes the inherent right of self-government as an existing aboriginal right under
section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.” Campbell, [2000] 189 D.L.R. (4th) 333 at *79-80.
92
John Borrows & Leonard I. Rotman, The Sui Generis Nature of Aboriginal Rights: Does
it Make a Difference?, 35 ALBERTA L. REV. 9, 10 (1997) (discussing generally the development of
the use of the sui generis term to describe aboriginal rights in Canada.
93
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 1108. The Aboriginal
conception of property would include things like “intuitive relationships with nature, or particular
understandings of the community’s relationship to territory. Such arrangements necessarily involve
specific understandings of trapping lines, of fishing grounds that are expressed through kinship ties,
and of the particular way that territory is familiar to each society.” Bryan, supra note 33, at 26.
Westerners “accustomed to see land and territory in terms of Cartesian space, and to see ownership
based in transactional value” fail to grasp the full resonance of aboriginal relationship. Id. at 27.
Looking generally at the kinds of relations we might tend to call ‘proprietary’ in
Aboriginal cultures, ‘property’ becomes embedded in seasonal significance, in kinship
significance, in spiritual significance, or in terms of general cultural practice, not in
‘chattels’ or ‘real property.’ . . . Thus, a tree is never simply timber; indeed a tree is often
something else, and can even be one’s grandfather (the important thing is that it is one’s
grandfather). . . .
Id. Bryan calls for new political and legal institutions that will allow divergent ways of life to
cohere; and a model for understanding the area of differences between Canadian (common law and
civilian) legal culture and the legal cultures of Aboriginal societies as they have developed. Id. at
29. “In creating a new relationship we need to ensure that the Canadian side does not continue in its
colonizing effects by using language and ideas instead of force as a form of unconscious eradication
of alternative understandings of the world.” Id. at 27-28.
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governed, at least not entirely, by European common law.94 It may also
mean that conventional common law analogies have force only to the
degree that they can be reconciled with the tradition, custom, practice or
law of the aboriginal group claiming the right. Essentially, “sui generis
territory allows for the expression and protection of Aboriginal rights
that existed prior to, and independently of, the common law.”95
In Australia, “native title” is recognized where it is not inconsistent
with the common law. The High Court of Australia so declared in Mabo
v. Queensland (“Mabo II”).96 There, the Meriam people of the Murray
Islands97 successfully sought a declaration that they had “native title” to
the island.98 Upon their annexation by the English Crown, the Murray
94
See Kent McNeil, Aboriginal Title and Aboriginal Rights: What’s The Connection?, 35
ALBERTA L. REV. 117, 118, 120 (1997).
95
Borrows & Rotman, supra note 92, at 30-31. These authors argue that the narrow focus
of the Supreme Court on what constitutes a unique culture for purposes of finding aboriginal rights
has removed the attention from formulations that consistently had their basis in the continued
existence of prior legal systems within Canada and the contemporary legal conceptions these
generate. The result of this focus is that “the Court has departed from exploring how Aboriginal
rights have come to existence within the common law and, instead, overly concentrated on who
holds the right as grounding their existence.” Id. at 36. A misplaced focus on “aboriginality” as
defining aboriginal rights may cause the court to focus upon “what was, once upon a time, integral
to indigenous cultures,” and not on the dynamics of a living culture, with contemporary traditions,
customs, practices and laws. Id. at 36, 38.
96
[No. 2] (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1. Mabo was presaged by Coe v. Commonwealth of Australia,
(1979) 24 A.L.R. 118, in which an Aborigine made a broad complaint for an injunction against
anyone using land currently being used by Aborigines. The complaint was dismissed on procedural
grounds. Id. Also before Mabo, was Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty. Ltd, (1971) 17 F.L.R. 141, where
the High Court of Australia ruled that Australia did not recognize communal native title and that the
relationship of the aboriginal people to the territory they claimed did not create a right of property.
The court did recognize that Aboriginal rights could exist, but that they could only be created by
statute. After the decision in Milirrpum, the Australian Parliament passed the Aboriginal Land
Rights (Northern Territory) Act, (1976) c. 119 (Austl.) that gave an Aborigine statutory title to land
once he proved that he had owned that land, so long as a claim was filed by June 5, 1997.
97
The Murray Islands lie in the Torres Strait, easternmost of the Eastern Islands of the
Strait. Mabo II, 175 C.L.R. at 16. Id. Their total land area is approximately 9 square kilometres.
The Meriam people, Melanesian, were in occupation of the Islands for generations before the first
Europeans arrived. Id. They lived a communal life in which gardening was of profound
importance, significant not only for purposes of subsistence but for facilitating various rituals
associated with different aspects of community life. Id. “Meriam society was regulated more by
custom than by law.” Id. at 18.
98
The Murray Islands were annexed to Queensland in 1879. Id. at 1. Upon annexation, the
Meriam People were told that the Islands would be held amenable to British law. Id. at 8. By an act
of the Queensland Government in 1882, the Murray Islands were “reserved” for native inhabitants.
Mabo II, 175 C.L.R. at 2. In the same year, a special lease of two acres on one of the islands was
granted by the Queensland Government to the London Missionary Society, which had assumed
some responsibility for law and order and for the peaceful resolution of disputes. Id. The chief
question for the court was whether these transactions had the effect of vesting in the Crown absolute
ownership of, legal possession of, and exclusive power to confer title to, all land in the Murray
Islands. Id. at 25. The Court answered in the negative. Id. at 2.
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Islands were deemed “desert and uninhabited,” thereby becoming
subject to the laws in force in Queensland, the common law becoming
the basic law.99 A century later, the High Court of Australia would
reject this characterization. Rather than terra nullius, the evidence
reconsidered showed that the Meriam had “a subtle and elaborate
[political] system” adapted to the country, providing a stable order of
society. It was a government of laws, and not of men.100 It was
admitted that the application of the enlarged notion of terra nullius
“depended on a discriminatory denigration of indigenous inhabitants,
their social organization and customs,” and was justified by a policy
which has “no place in the contemporary law of this country.”101
Though the rejection of terra nullius cleared away the fictional
impediment to the recognition of indigenous rights and interests in
colonial land, it would still be impossible to recognize native title if the
basic doctrines of the common law were inconsistent with their
recognition.102 They were not.103
The characteristics of native title mirror those of aboriginal title in
Canada in the sense of title being founded in and given its content by the
traditional laws and customs acknowledged and observed by the
indigenous occupants.104
It is also so in the sense of being
extinguishable if the indigenous group ceases to acknowledge those
traditional laws and customs on which native title is founded, loses its
99

Id. at 58.
Id. at 38.
101
Id. at 41-43. Referring to Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol.
102
Id. at 68; see also Wik Peoples v. Queensland, (1996) 187 C.L.R. 1, available at [1996]
WL 33102484.
103
Mabo II, 175 C.L.R. at 71. First, the Court concluded that “[r]ecognition of the radical
title of the Crown [was] quite consistent with recognition of native title to land, for the radical title,
without more, is merely a logical postulate required to support the doctrine of tenure (when the
Crown has exercised its sovereign power to grant an interest in land) and to support the plenary title
of the Crown (when the Crown has exercised its sovereign power to appropriate to itself ownership
of parcels of land within the Crown’s territory).” Id. at 50. Unless the sovereign power is exercised
in one or other of those ways, there is no reason why land within the Crown’s territory should not
continue to be subject to native title.” Id. at 50-51. The Court went on to reject the “patrimony of
the nation” basis of the proposition of absolute Crown ownership, to the extent that the political
power to dispose of land in disregard of native title has not occurred, native title can still be
recognized. Id. at 52. The Court also rejected the Royal Prerogative basis of the proposition of
absolute Crown sovereignty, relying on the rule that in the absence of express confiscation or of
subsequent exproprietary legislation, the conqueror has respected indigenous claims to land and
forbone to diminish or modify them and further, that a mere change in sovereignty does not
extinguish native title to land. Id. at 53.
104
Id. at 71; see generally, Matthew C. Miller, Comments, An Australian Nunavut? A
Comparison of Inuit and Aboriginal Rights Movements in Canada and Australia, 12 EMORY INT’L
L. REV. 1175, 1195 (1998).
100
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connection with the land or ceases to exist as a group or clan.105 Like
Canadian aboriginal title, native title is inalienable except to the
Crown.106 Where a difference in theory, may lie if only subtly, is where
Australia has assigned native title in the Australian property law system.
Native title is neither an institution of the common law, nor a form of
common law land tenure, but it is recognized by the common law.107
Rights and interests possessed under the traditional laws or customs of
the aboriginal peoples are therefore not enforceable per se, but only to
the extent that the common law or some statute recognizes and gives
effect to them.108 Looked upon as rights that are in a sense alien or
extraneous to the common law system, they are inferior and
precarious.109
“Original Indian title”110 is a federal common law right that gives a
“right of occupancy” to recognized Indian Tribes.111 The Supreme Court
has spoken of original Indian title as an “unquestioned right” to the
exclusive possession of aboriginal lands112 and as a right of occupancy
“as sacred as the fee simple of the whites.”113 That characterization was
not altogether true.114
105

Mabo II, 175 C.L.R. at 71.
It follows, therefore, that one who is not a member of the indigenous people holding
native title, who does not acknowledge their laws and observe their customs, can acquire no interest
in the land by transfer. The Meriam people from the advent of the English “asserted an exclusive
right to occupy the Murray Islands and, as a community, held a proprietary interest in the Islands.
They have maintained their identity as a people and they observ[ed] customs which [were]
traditionally based.” Id. at 61.
107
Id. at 59-61.
108
Id. at 59, 61; Wik Peoples v. Queensland, (1996) 187 C.L.R. 1, *3, available at [1996]
WL 33102484. [Wik Peoples v. Queensland].
109
See Nehal Bhuta, Mabo, Wik and the Art of Paradigm Management, 22 MELBOURNE U.
L. R. 24, 36, 40 (1998) (discussing the place of native title in the Australian property law hierarchy);
Michael Mansell, Australians and Aborigines and the Mabo Decision: Just Who Needs Whom the
Most?, 15 SYDNEY L. REV. 168 (1993).
110
See generally, Cohen, supra note 55. Howard R. Berman, The Concept of Aboriginal
Rights in the Early Legal History of the United States, 27 BUFF. L. REV. 637 (1977).
111
Cohen, supra note 55, at 28.
112
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (Mem.).
113
Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 746 (1835); United States v. Santa Fe Pac.
R.R., 314 U.S. 339 (1941); United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111 (1938).
114
In fact, during the early expansionist movement in this country, the government pursued a
policy of “removal and relocation of many tribes, often by treaty but also by force.” Cobell v.
Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see generally, Ralph W. Johnson, Indian Tribes and
the Legal System, 72 WASH. L. REV. 1021, 1022 (1997). “In the second half of the nineteenth
century, the policy of relocation was replaced with one of assimilation, . . . [when] the federal
government began to divide Indian lands into individual parcels, taking lands that had been set aside
for Indian tribes and allotting them to individual tribal members.” Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1087; see
generally, FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 210 (Univ. of New Mexico Press
106
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The Supreme Court decision in Johnson v. M’Intosh115 is often the
starting point for understanding the nature of original Indian title. But
the opinion is fraught with incoherence and ad hoc rationalizations.
Chief Justice Marshall vacillated on the theory that the European nations
acquired title to land first occupied by Indian Tribes, first referring to the
doctrine of discovery,116 then stating that discovery could be converted
into conquest, by which means Indian lands could be taken against their
will.117
1971) (1942). The objectives were “to extinguish tribal sovereignty, erase reservation boundaries,
and force assimilation of Indians into the society at large.’” Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1087, citing
Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 254 (1992); Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Hodel,
851 F.2d 1439, 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1988). “Once tribal lands were allotted in fee to individual Indians,
white settlers could purchase the lands for settlement. . . . [The assimilationist policy] may not have
achieved assimilation, [but] it did result in the widespread transfer of land from Indians to white
settlers. . . . [Between] 1887 to 1934, an estimated 90 million acres, accounting for approximately
two-thirds of all Indian lands, left Indian ownership.” Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1087. Citing Cobell v.
Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 1999) (“Cobell V”). “Allotment of tribal lands [ended] with
enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (“IRA”), 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. § 461 et. seq).” Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1087. “After passage of the IRA, federal Indian
policy changed yet again. In the 1950’s, Congress adopted a ‘termination policy,’ whereby it
sought to release Indian tribes from federal supervision and terminate the government-Indian
relationship.” Id. “The termination policy . . . was replaced with the current policy of ‘selfdetermination and self-governance.”. . . Id. at 1088.
115
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). There, plaintiffs claimed title through Indian tribes on the
basis of deeds made out some fifty years earlier. Id. at 571-72. The defendants claimed the same
land under later-executed patents from the United States. Id. at 578. The plaintiffs sought the
remedy of ejectment. Id. at 571. The facts showed the “authority of the Indian chiefs who executed
[the] conveyance” and also that the “particular tribes for whom these chiefs acted were in rightful
possession of the land they sold.” Id. at 572. Thus, if the received first principle of first possession
had been applied, plaintiffs’ title should have been found to be good and defendant’s void. Id. at
596-97.
116
Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 572; see also ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN
INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 312 (1990). In Worcester
v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), Chief Justice Marshall wrote that the principle agreed to by
the colonial powers “regulated the right given by discovery among the european discoverers; but
could not affect the rights of those already in possession, either as aboriginal occupants, or as
occupants by virtue of a discovery made before the memory of man. It gave the exclusive right to
purchase, but did not found that right on a denial of the right of the possessors to sell.” Id. at 544.
117
Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 589. Compare the views of Justice Johnson in his dissent
in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 146 (1810). In his dissent, Justice Johnson pointed out
that Indian nations whose lands had not been acquired by conquest or purchase were ‘absolute
proprietors of their soil.’ Id. at 147. Since more than one fee simple could not exist in the same
land at the same time, the absolute proprietorship of the Indians excluded the seisin in fee of
another. Id. at 146-47. On what interest the United States had in the soil, Justice Johnson explained
that “[u]naffected by particular treaties, it is nothing more than what was assumed at the first
settlement of the country, to wit, a right of conquest or of purchase, exclusively of all competitors
within certain defined limits. All the restrictions upon the right of soil in the Indians, amount only
to an exclusion of all competitors from their markets.” Id. at 147. McNeil points out, though, that
neither Johnson, nor Marshall got it right. In English law, “the solution to the problem . . . would
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The theory of conquest seemed belied by the continual warring
between settlers and the Indians.118 With respect to discovery, the Court
applied neither English common law nor international law, under which
the Indians would have been regarded as English subjects and given
protections against the taking of lands occupied by them.119 Professor
McNeil’s assessment is that
[W]hen questions involving indigenous land rights began to come
before the courts, the tendency was to look for answers outside English
law. Chief Justice Marshall’s early American decisions in particular
ignored common law principles and constructed a vague theory of
Indian title on the basis of doubtful premises drawn to some extent
from his own perceptions of international law. In effect, what
Marshall did was invent a body of law which was virtually without
precedent.120

Professor Cohen added:
It is perhaps Pickwickian to say that the Federal Government exercised
power to make grants of lands still in Indian possession as a
consequence of its ‘dominion’ or ‘title.’ A realist would say that
Federal ‘dominion’ or ‘title’ over land recognized to be in Indian
ownership was merely a fiction devised to get around a theoretical
difficulty posed by common law concepts. . . . [that], a grant by a
private person of land belonging to another would convey no title. To
apply this rule to the Federal Government would have produced a cruel
dilemma: either Indians had no title and no rights or the Federal land
grants on which much of our economy rested were void. The Supreme
Court would accept neither horn of this dilemma, nor would it say . . .
have been to accord the State seisin in fee of a paramount lordship over lands of which the Indian
occupiers would have been seised in demesne for fee simple estates.” MCNEIL, supra note 39, at
252.
118
In Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955), the Court settled on the
theory of conquest. The Court declared that the American colonies were acquired by conquest such
that absolute title to the soil vested in the conquering European power automatically, along with
sovereignty. Id. at 280. This meant that while the new sovereign allowed the Indian inhabitants to
remain in occupation, the Indians had a right of occupancy as against third parties, but no rights at
all as against the sovereign, unless he recognized their occupation as ownership. Id. Absent such
recognition, their original Indian title would be non-proprietary, amounting merely to permissive
occupation at the will of the sovereign. Id. Indeed, according to Congress, the United States
claimed title by right of conquest only once and then only half-heartedly. Kades, supra note 52, at
74. In fact, the United States purchased much of the land it obtained from Indian Tribes. Id.
119
MCNEIL, supra note 39, at 246. Indeed, the Royal Proclamation of 1763 did this. Id. at
248. Where persons of European descent were concerned, American courts adopted an approach
based on the doctrine of continuity. Id.; United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 86-87
(1833).
120
MCNEIL, supra note 39, at 301.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2003

21

Akron Law Review, Vol. 36 [2003], Iss. 2, Art. 2
GREEN1.DOC

266

3/19/03 3:15 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:245

that the Federal Government is not bound by the limitation of common
law doctrine . . . [this] . . . would have run contrary to the spirit of the
times by claiming for the Federal Government a right to disregard rules
of real property law more sacred than the Constitution itself. And this
theoretical dilemma was neatly solved by Chief Justice Marshall’s
doctrine that the Federal Government and the Indians both had
exclusive title to the same land at the same time.121

Chief Justice Marshall was not otherwise inclined to examine the
legality of acts upon which the land titles of so many Americans
depended. The result of this constraint was to make the issue of the
Indians’ land rights a political one and nonjusticiable.122
The
consequence of “drawing this judicial blind on the past, was to sanction
future seizures of Indian lands as well as to assign the whole matter to
the political arena. Where their original title was concerned . . ., Indians
[were] therefore denied constitutional protection accorded to [other]
American citizens.”123
Decisions about the nature and contours of original Indian title were
virtually ad hoc until 1955 when the Supreme Court finally concluded
that such title conferred no proprietary interest in the Indians, merely
121

Cohen, supra note 56, at 48-49.
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574, 588-92.
123
MCNEIL, supra note 39, at 261. The defendant in M’Intosh would have denied all rights
to the Indians, arguing that they could not have passed title to the plaintiffs’ predecessors because
“by the law of nature,” the Indians themselves had never done acts on the land sufficient to establish
property in it, i.e., the Indians had never really undertaken those acts of possession that gave rise to
a property right in the first place. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 569. It was the case that the
Indian tribes moved from place to place, leaving few traces to indicate that they claimed the land (if
indeed they did). The argument was essentially that Indian cultures before the coming of the
Europeans was in the “state of nature,” that is, pre-society and pre-government, that the land
occupied by Indian nations was terra nullius and as such could be appropriated by those who would
dominate. Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Medieval and Renaissance Origins of the Status of the
American Indian in Western Legal Thought, 57 S. CAL. L. R. 1, 3 (1983). This argument did have
appeal at the time of the decision to the extent that the theory of first possession made sense in an
agrarian society or among commercial people—a people whose activities with respect to the objects
around them required an unequivocal assertion of dominion such that those objects could be either
managed or traded. On the other hand, “some Indians professed bewilderment at the concept of
owning the land. Indeed they prided themselves on not marking the land but rather on moving
lightly through it, living with the land and with its creatures as members of the same family rather
than as strangers who visited only to conquer the objects of nature.” Rose, supra note 27, at 87-88.
See generally, Robert A. Williams, Jr., Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of
European Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L.
REV. 237 (1989); see generally, WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS,
AND THE ECOLOGY OF NEW ENGLAND (1983). While that was not the nature of the American
Indian society, evaluating the Indians’ connection with the land on the basis of their own conditions
of life and their own perspectives, would no doubt be regarded as occupation sufficient for
grounding title. MCNEIL, supra note 39, at 117.
122
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permission to occupy government-owned lands.124 As it stands then, it is
a perpetual right that entitles the holders to full beneficial use of
aboriginal lands including the right to standing timber and subsurface
minerals,125 but it is not alienable either voluntarily or involuntarily,
except to, or with the approval of, the federal government.126
B. Sovereign Prerogative of Extinguishment
By constitutional amendment: “[t]he existing aboriginal and treaty
rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are . . . recognized and
affirmed.”127 They nevertheless can be infringed, under certain
circumstances,128 where there is a valid governmental objective sought
to be accomplished by the challenged infringement,129 those objectives
are “compelling and substantial,”130 there is not an underlying
unconstitutional objective, the infringement is “absolutely necessary to
accomplish the required limitation,” and the infringement is consistent
with the Crown’s fiduciary duty to the Aboriginal peoples.131 Because
124

Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, 348 U.S. at 285.
Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S.
553 (1902); United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111 (1938).
126
Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574.
127
CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982), § 35(1). After the assertion of sovereignty by the
British Crown, and continuing to and after the time of Confederation, although the right of
aboriginal people to govern themselves was diminished, it was not extinguished. Any aboriginal
right to self-government could be extinguished after Confederation and before the 1982
constitutional amendment by federal legislation which plainly expressed that intention, or it could
be replaced or modified by the negotiation of treaty. After 1982, such rights could not be
extinguished, but could be defined (given content) in a treaty. [The Nisga’a Treaty does the latter]
See Campbell v. British Columbia, [2000] 189 D.L.R. (4th) 333, 2000 C.R.D.J. LEXIS 281 at *2-3.
128
R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075. The case involved the traditional rights of
Aboriginal peoples to fish and whether those rights fell under the regulatory scheme established by
federal fishing legislation. Id. The court laid down what has since come to be known as the
“Sparrow justificatory test” for determining when aboriginal rights can be curtailed. It must be
established that: 1) an applicant for relief was acting pursuant to aboriginal authority; 2) the right
was extinguished prior to the enactment of § 35(1); 3) the right had been infringed; and 4) the
infringement was justified. Id.
129
These include objectives concerned with conservation and management, “agriculture,
forestry, mining and hydro-electric power, the general economic development of the interior of
British Columbia, protection of the environment or endangered species, and the building of
infrastructure and the settlement of foreign populations to support those aims.” Delgamuukw v.
British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 1021. However, a general aim to further the “public
interest” is not an adequate justification. Id.
130
In this vein, the right to exclusive use and occupation of land is relevant to the degree of
scrutiny the infringing measure or action should be given.
131
The fulfillment of this fiduciary duty requires that in appropriate circumstances, the
Crown is obliged to choose those methods involving the least amount of infringement on Aboriginal
rights to effect the desired result and to consult with the Aboriginal peoples. The right of the Crown
125
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lands held pursuant to aboriginal title have an inescapable economic
component, fair compensation will ordinarily be required when
aboriginal title is infringed.132
In Mabo II, the High Court of Australia lamented the misfortune of
the Aboriginal peoples of Australia that over the last 200 years, “the
government . . . [having] alienated or appropriated to its own purposes
most of the [traditional aboriginal lands] . . . in th[e] country.”133 That
was a consequence of sovereignty which carried the power to create and
to extinguish private rights and interests in land within the sovereign’s
territory.134 That sovereign power may or may not be exercised with
solicitude for the welfare of indigenous inhabitants, and in the case of
the Aboriginal people, it seems it was not. The Aboriginals “were
dispossessed by the Crown’s exercise of its sovereign powers to grant
land to whom it chose and to appropriate to itself the beneficial
ownership of parcels of land for the Crown’s purposes.”135
Nevertheless, native title was not extinguished by the mere operation of
the common law on first settlement by British colonists. Extinguishment
instead required the exercise of a power to extinguish and needed to be
accomplished by a clear and plain intention to do so.136 Consequently,
where the Crown had not granted interests in land or reserved and
dedicated land inconsistently with the right to continued enjoyment of
native title by the indigenous inhabitants, native title survived and is
legally enforceable.137 This means that grants of estates of freehold or of
leases; the appropriation for use by the government (whether by
dedication, setting aside, reservation or other valid means); and the use
of native lands for roads, railways, post offices and other permanent
public works which preclude the continuing concurrent enjoyment of
to choose the uses to which the land can be put, subject to the ultimate limitation that those uses
cannot destroy the ability of the land to sustain future generations of Aboriginal peoples requires the
involvement of Aboriginal peoples in such decisions.
132
Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 1075.
133
Mabo II, at 175 C.L.R. 1, *68.
134
Id. The exercise of sovereignty was nonetheless subject to the Constitution and other
valid laws, such as the Racial Discrimination Act. For example, the Queensland Coast Island
Declaratory Act of 1985 purported to extinguish retrospectively any and all traditional rights to land
in the Torres Strait without compensation. That Act was declared invalid by the High Court, as
being contrary to the Racial Discrimination Act of 1975. Mabo v. Queensland (“Mabo I”), (1988)
166 C.L.R. 186.
135
Mabo II, 175 C.L.R. at *68.
136
Id. citing Calder v. Attorney-Gen. [1973] S.C.R. 313, 404; Baker Lake v. Minister of
Indian Affairs [1979] 107 D.L.R. (3d) 513, 552; Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075; United States v.
Santa Fe Pac. R..R.. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 353-54 (1941); Lipan Apache Tribe v. United States, 180
Ct. Cl. 487 (1967).
137
Mabo II, 175 C.L.R. at *68-69.
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native title, extinguished native title, but grants of lesser interests (such
as the authority to prospect for minerals), did not.138 As it stands,
aboriginal lands that have been conveyed to private holders are forever
lost.
Original Indian title can be terminated and fully disposed of by the
federal government with no obligation to compensate its holders.139 The
Supreme Court declared: “Indian occupation of land without government
recognition of ownership creates no rights against taking or extinction by
the United States protected by the Fifth Amendment or any other
principle of law.”140 The sovereign’s intent to extinguish original Indian
title, though, must be “plain and unambiguous” and will not “lightly be
implied.”141 It is not extinguished by a grant by the government of the
fee, but that grantee takes title subject to the Indian right of
occupancy.142 The “right of occupancy” that original Indian title gives
should be distinguished from “recognized title,” the latter existing where
Congress, by treaty or other agreement, has declared that thereafter
Indians are to hold lands permanently. Recognized title cannot be
abrogated by the government without due process of law and
compensation. In contrast, where Congress has made provision to
Indian Tribes to recover for injury by the disposal of original Indian title,
it was simply as a matter of grace.143

138
In Mabo II, the High Court explained that “[a] clear and plain intention to extinguish
native title is not revealed by a law which merely regulates the enjoyment of native title [fn omitted]
or which creates a regime of control that is consistent with the continued enjoyment of native title.
[fn omitted] A fortiori, a law which reserves or authorizes the reservation of land from sale for the
purpose of permitting indigenous inhabitants and their descendants to enjoy their native title works
no extinguishment.” Id. at *64-65.
139
Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476 (1937).
140
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 285 (1955). There, by a resolution of
Congress, “the Secretary of Agriculture was authorized to contract for the sale of national forest
timber within [the] National Forest ‘notwithstanding any claim of possessory rights,’” which were
defined as “all rights . . . which are based upon aboriginal occupancy or title.” Id. at 276.
141
Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 227 (1985).
142
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); see generally, Cohen, supra note
121, at 29-30.
143
Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 281. Although not constitutionally compelled to do so,
Congress eventually passed a statute compensating native inhabitants of Alaska for the loss of their
land in the amount of $962.5 million plus about 40 million acres of federal lands. Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act of 1971, 43 U.S.C. § 1601, et. seq. The act extinguished land claims to 335
million acres.
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IV. RECLAIMING ABORIGINAL LANDS
A. Legal Theories
Can the Wiljen People establish aboriginal title to Antarctica? Can
the Miami Tribe do the same in the State of Illinois? Can the Gitksan
and Wet’suwet’en establish title to British Vancouver? In Canada, by
constitutional provision, aboriginal title is recognized, although it is left
to the aboriginal claimants to establish title in accordance with the
principles laid down by the Canadian Supreme Court. Indigenous
peoples therefore are offering proof of prior possession and adherence to
traditional customs and laws as the predicate for a judicial declaration of
aboriginal title. In Australia, indigenous people have been prosecuting
claims under the Native Title Act144 for declarations of native title based
on traditional connections to the land.145 Although under the principles
laid out in Mabo II, the only land available for such claims is that held
by the Crown and by mineral interest lessees of the Crown, but not lands
covered by grants from the Crown, those grants having extinguished
native title.146
144

Native Title Act of 1993, c. 110 (Austl.).
See, e.g., Ngalakan People v. Northern Territory, Fed. Ct. of Austl., 2001 Aust. Fed. Ct.
LEXIS 49, *6, *58 (June 5, 2001) (establishing title over a small area on the southern bank of the
Roper River in the Northern Territory by evidence that at the time the Crown acquired sovereignty,
the claimants were an identifiable community or organized society who possessed, occupied, used
and enjoyed the claim area according to their traditional laws and customs); See also Passi v.
Queensland, 2001 WL 665585 (June 14, 2001) (stating that claim to land and inland waters of the
islands of Dauar and Waier settled upon proof of claimants long connection with the land, and their
traditional laws and customs.; The native title established including the right to live on the land,
conserve, manage, use and enjoy the natural resources of it, including for social, cultural, economic,
religious, spiritual, customary and traditional purposes and autonomy over the land); Ngallametta v.
Queensland, 2000 Aust. Fed.Ct LEXIS 809 (3 Oct. 2000) (noting that the agreement for the
settlement of a claim to unallocated Crown lands, which title conferred possession, occupation, use
and enjoyment, but not minerals); Anderson v. Western Australia, 2000 Aust. Fed.Ct. LEXIS 1071
*8 (Nov. 28, 2000) (discussing an agreement between the state of Western Australia and the
Spinifex people for the return of 55,000 square kilometres, which covered the southern portion of
the Great Victoria Desert). Id.; The terms of the settlement recognized native title, including the
right to possess, occupy, use and enjoy the land, the right to make decisions about the land, but not
to minerals or petroleum or subterranean waters, except in the case of water taken in the exercise of
certain specified native title rights. Id. The Spinifex established their claim by demonstrating their
long connection with the land and their distinct customs and practices).
146
The Native Title Act validated all prior acts where native title was under the sole
ownership of non-natives and had thereby been effectively extinguished. However, aborigines
whose native title was extinguished were entitled to compensation if their title was extinguished
after the enactment of Commonwealth’s Racial Discrimination Act of 1975, as long as they could
demonstrate their connection with the land at the time of annexation. As a result of Mabo II and the
Act, over three hundred native title claims were filed with the Tribunal by 1997. The Act also
145
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In the United States where original Indian title has not been
extinguished by the federal government, it theoretically can be recovered
from current non-native occupiers, since by its definition it was
incapable of alienation in the first place. For more than two centuries,
the Indian Nonintercourse Acts147 have made any purported conveyance
of aboriginal lands void. The first such Act was passed in 1790 and has
not changed materially since that time.148 The original purposes stated
were to prevent the “unfair, improvident or improper disposition” of
tribal lands to parties other than the United States, without the consent of
Congress, and to prevent Indian unrest over encroachment by settlers on
Indian lands.149 The original Act dealt with unauthorized alienation of
Indian lands in two ways: it declared that any such conveyance made in
violation of the Act’s provisions shall be of no validity in law or equity
and also prescribed penalties—fines, imprisonment and forfeiture.150
established the National Native Title Tribunal, a mediating body, to process and hear native title
claims and fund programs to assist disputes over native title.
147
25 U.S.C. § 177.
148
Id. The Act provides: “No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any
title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law or
equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the Constitution.”
Id.
149
See Nonintercourse Act, 1 Stat. 329-32 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 177).
150
The first Act established the framework for addressing contracts between the Indians and
non-Indians, which the later Acts followed and expanded upon. Id. at 329. Section 3 required
persons caught attempting to trade with the Indians or found in Indian country without a license to
forfeit all the merchandise in their possession, and provided that such person could be fined or
imprisoned. Id. at 329. Section 5 of the 1793 Act provided that “if any such citizen or inhabitant
shall make a settlement on lands belonging to any Indian tribe . . . he shall forfeit a sum not
exceeding one thousand dollars, nor less than one hundred dollars, and suffer imprisonment not
exceeding twelve months” and gave the President the power to remove unlawful settlers. Id. at 329,
330. (codified as 25 U.S.C. § 180). The 1796 Act also included the forfeiture provisions, that any
person settling on Indian land shall “forfeit all his right, title and claim, if any he has, of whatsoever
nature or kind the same shall, or may be, to the lands aforesaid.” Id. Congress repealed the
forfeiture provisions in 1802. The 1796, 1799 and 1802 Acts also contained a comprehensive
remedial scheme for handling private disputes between Indians and non-Indians. Section 4 in all
three versions required non-Indians to compensate Indians for property taken or destroyed by them
[concerned with personal property] in an amount equal to twice the value of such property and if the
offender was unable to pay a sum at least equal to the value of the property, the shortfall would be
paid out of the Treasury, subject to the Indians’ obligation not to seek private revenge or satisfaction
by force or violence. The 1834 version purported to strengthen the powers of the president the
government to remove all persons found to be illegally in Indian Country, authorizing him to take
whatever measures were necessary to remove persons making settlements on Indian lands.
Nonintercourse Act, 4 Stat. 730. At the same time, Congress repealed the criminal penalties, but
retained the provisions for fines. Id. Congress also added: “All penalties which shall accrue under
this act, shall be sued for and recovered in an action of debt, in the name of the United States, . . .
the one half going to the use of the informer, and the other half to the use of the United States,
except when the prosecution shall be first instituted on behalf of the United States, in which case the
whole shall be to their use.” Id.
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The other available legal theory for the recovery of aboriginal lands
is breach of treaty as to “recognized title,” where that breach amounts to
a taking of property. But that theory was not always available. Until
1871, the federal policy was to deal with Indian tribes by means of
treaties. After that time, Congress determined to relate to Indians only
by acts of Congress.151 But even treaty rights acquired before 1871 were
precarious and subject to the politics in Congress. In Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock,152 the Supreme Court ruled that the same plenary power that
allowed Congress to extinguish aboriginal title, also authorized it to
abrogate the provisions of an Indian treaty under which recognized title
arose.153 That power, said the Court “ha[d] always been . . . a political
one, not subject to be controlled by the judicia[ry].”154 Thus, where
Congress purported to give the Indians adequate consideration for their
lands affected by the abrogation of a treaty, the court would presume
that Congress acted in perfect good faith in dealing with the Indians and
exercised its best judgment in the matter.155 The result of Lone Wolf was
that if the Indians suffered injury by Congress’ unilateral abrogation of
treaty rights, the courts would offer no aid. Instead, relief would have to
be sought by an appeal to Congress. In this sense, Lone Wolf seemed to
render “recognized title” indistinguishable from “original Indian title.”
Although the case has never been expressly overruled, it has been
151

The Act provided:
No Indian nation or tribe, within the territories of the United States shall be
acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power, with whom the
United States may contract by treaty; but no obligation of any treaty lawfully made and
ratified with any such Indian Nation or tribe prior to March third, eighteen hundred and
twenty-one, shall be hereby invalidated or impaired.
Act of March 3, 1871, 16 Stat. 566, carried into § 2079.
152
187 U.S. 553, 565-66 (1903). There, an 1867 treaty with certain Indian tribes established
a reservation and provided that no treaty for the cession of reservation lands would be “of any
validity or force” unless executed and signed by three-quarters of the adult males. Id. at 564. In
1892, the Indians agreed to cede that reservation to the United States, in return for allotments out of
those lands and the payment to and setting aside for the Indians of $2 million. Id. at 555. The
requisite three-quarters of the Indians did not sign the agreement. Id. at 556. But in 1900, Congress
enacted a statute which in effect adopted the 1892 agreement. Id. at 559. The Indians filed suit
seeking to enjoin the government from carrying out the statute because it violated the 1867 treaty
requirement of consent by three-fourths of adult male Indians. Id. at 560.
153
Id. at 565-66. The Court cautioned though that “presumably such power will be exercised
only when circumstances arise which will not only justify the government in disregarding the
stipulations of the treaty, but may demand, in the interest of the country and Indians themselves, that
it should do so.” Id. at 566.
154
Id. at 565.
155
Id. at 567-68. The Court explained that because Congress has the power to abrogate
treaties, the Court may not specially consider contentions that the signatures of the Indians signing
the agreement to cede land were obtained by fraud or that the requisite three-quarter signatures were
not obtained. Id. at 567-68.
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limited to its facts, such that where a court finds government conduct not
evincing that degree of good faith required of a guardian to its ward, or
the consideration offered in exchange for the abrogation of the treaty is
inadequate, the Indians may be entitled to compensation.156
B. Legal Forums
Indians were thwarted and relegated to pleas to Congress157
regarding their aboriginal lands not solely because of the Supreme
Court’s judicial blind on the fact of original Indian title or the sui generis
conception of aboriginal title, but in large part because the usual
mechanisms for the protection of property were denied to Indians.158
The United States could not be sued without its consent and while the
Court of Claims permitted litigation of certain types of suits against the
government, 159 claims based upon violation of Indian treaties were
excluded from its jurisdiction in 1863.160 Special congressional acts
were commonly required before tribes could bring suit and on various
occasions, Congress did pass such legislation.161 In other respects, while
they were not aliens, Indians were not at the same time uniformly
granted citizenship.162 As Indian Tribes could not maintain actions in the

156
See United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980), discussed supra, note 11 finding
the United States liable for failing to fulfill its obligations under treaty. Also, the Court stated that
“[m]ore significantly, Lone Wolf’s presumption of congressional good faith has little to commend it
as an enduring principle for deciding questions of the kind presented here. . . .” Id. at 414-15. See
also United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103 (1935) (stating that although an abrogation of
treaty is effective, the Indian Tribe will be entitled to compensation for a taking under the Fifth
Amendment); Sioux Nation v. United States, 601 F.2d 1157, 1175-76 (Claims 1979) (refusing to
read Lone Wolf as sanctioning any arbitrary move Congress may choose to make with respect to
property rights of Indians created by treaty). Id. Instead, only such moves as are purported (i.e.,
shown by the published record) to provide an “adequate consideration” in any exchange of lands for
anything else [would be found as coming within Lone Wolf].
157
See also Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1701 (2002); Maine
Indian Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1711 (2002).
158
Jaeger v. United States, 27 Ct. Cl. 278, 282 (1892) (stating that “The civil rights incident
to States and individuals . . . have not been accorded either to Indian nations, tribes, or Indians”);
see Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317, 332 (1892) (showing that until the Sioux became citizens of the
United States in 1887, they were incapable of suing in any of the courts of the United States).
159
While white citizens were permitted to sue the federal government under the Tucker Act,
Indian tribes were not. 24 Stat. 505.
160
Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 92, § 9, 12 Stat. 765, 767.
161
See discussion in Sioux Nation, infra; Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United
States, 324 U.S. 335 (1945).
162
The Supreme Court first closed the courthouse doors to Indian tribes in Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), where it ruled that Indian tribes were not foreign states so as
not to give the federal courts jurisdiction.
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federal courts,163 they were relegated to often hostile state courts.164
It took nearly a century of effort by the Sioux Nation to win a
federal judicial forum for the resolution of their land claims under treaty.
They had maintained all this time that the United States had breached the
Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 under which the United States pledged that
the Great Sioux Reservation that included the Black Hills of South
Dakota, would be “set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and
occupation” of the Sioux.165 Although the government had wind of the
news of the discovery of gold in the Black Hills and knew that white
prospectors were invading the reservation land, it did nothing to secure
the reservation borders.166 Indeed, as the influx of miners increased, the
government decided to obtain for all citizens the right to mine the Black
Hills for gold in total abrogation of the Treaty. Toward that end, the
Secretary of Interior appointed a commission to negotiate with the Sioux
for the purchase of the Black Hills. The Sioux refused to sell for less
163
In 1966, a federal court jurisdictional act, 28 U.S.C. § 1362, granted district courts
original jurisdiction in all civil actions arising under federal law and brought by any federally
recognized Indian tribe or land, and removed all jurisdictional barriers to federal court. When read
in conjunction with the Indian commerce clause, it effected a waiver of state sovereign immunity in
suits brought by Indian tribes.
164
See, e.g., Onondaga Nation v. Thacher, 62 N.E. 1098 (N.Y. 1901) (per curiam); Johnson
v. Long Island R.R., 56 N.E. 992 (N.Y. 1900); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832);
Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 464 F.2d 916, 923, n. 9 (2d Cir. 1972), rev’d on other
grounds, 414 U.S. 661, 678 (1974).
165
Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 374 (1980). “The Fort Laramie Treaty was concluded at the
culmination of the Powder River War of 1866-67,” in which the Sioux fought to protect the integrity
of earlier-recognized treaty lands (Treaty of September 17, 1851) and included all of the present
State of South Dakota, and parts of what is now Nebraska, Wyoming, North Dakota, and Montana.
Id. The reservation also included a narrow strip of land west of the Missouri River and north of the
border between North and South Dakota. Id. at 375 n.2. In the treaty, the United States “‘solemnly
[agreed]’ that no unauthorized persons ‘shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in
[this] territory.’” Id. at 375. In addition, the United States “permitted members of the Sioux tribes
to select lands within the reservation for cultivation” and to assist them in becoming farmers, the
United States “promised to provide necessary services and materials, and with subsistence rations
for four years.” Id. at 375. “The treaty called for the construction of schools, the provision of
teachers for the education of Indian children, the provision of seeds, agricultural instruments . . . the
provision of blacksmiths, carpenters, millers, and engineers” as well as “certain articles of clothing”
to each Sioux once per year for thirty years and an annual stipend of $10 per person for all members
of the Sioux nation who continued to engage in hunting and $20 to those who settled on the
reservation to engage in farming. Id. at 375 n. 3. In exchange, the Sioux “agreed to relinquish their
rights under [an earlier treaty], to occupy territories outside the reservation,” while reserving their
“right to hunt on any lands north of North Platte and on the Republican Fork of the Smoky Hill
River, so long as the buffalo may range thereon in such numbers as to justify the chase.” Id. at 375.
They also agreed to withdraw “opposition to the building of railroads that did not pass over their
reservation land, not to engage in attacks on settlers, and to withdraw their opposition to the military
posts and roads that had been established south of the North Platte River.” Id. at 375-76.
166
Id. at 378.
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than $70 million. The commission offered an annual rental of $400,000
or $6 million for absolute relinquishment. As the negotiations broke
down,167 the United States employed the additional leverage of
threatening to withhold appropriations for the subsistence provisions it
was obligated to provide under the Treaty.168 The Sioux succumbed.
Although the original Treaty required that a cession of lands within the
reservation be accomplished by the joinder of three-fourths of the adult
male Sioux, the treaty of cession was presented only to Sioux chiefs and
their leading men and was signed by only ten percent of the adult
males.169 In 1877, Congress ratified the agreement which formally
abrogated the Fort Laramie Treaty.170
Whatever the Sioux’s desire to protest the irregularities in the
cession of the Black Hills, at the time there was no avenue for judicial
redress. Fifty-three years later, in 1920, Congress enacted a special
jurisdictional act that provided a forum, a claims court, for the
adjudication of claims by Native Americans against the United States
under any treaties.171 In 1923, the Sioux filed a petition in that claims
court seeking compensation for the taking of the Black Hills172 and
alternatively for a breach of the government’s fiduciary duty as trustee
of their reservation lands. It was not until 1942 after many procedural
maneuvers, that a unanimous court dismissed the claim on the ground
that the 1920 Act did not authorize suit challenging the adequacy of the
price paid for the Black Hills and that the Sioux’ claim in that regard
was but a “moral” claim.173
In 1946, Congress reversed that ruling with the passage of the
Indian Claims Commission Act,174 which created a new forum to hear
167

Id. at 378-79.
Id. at 381. Historians have recounted that starvation and near starvation conditions
existed among the Sioux because of the poor quality and insufficient amounts of rations. Id. at 381
n.11.
169
Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 381-82. The agreement “altered the boundaries of the Great
Sioux Reservation by adding some 900,000 acres of land to the north, while carving out virtually all
that portion of the reservation . . . [that] include[ed] the Black Hills, an area well over 7 million
acres. [The Sioux] also relinquished their rights to hunt in the unceded lands recognized by the Fort
Laramie Treaty, and agreed that three wagon roads could be cut through their reservation.” Id. at
383.
170
Id. at 382-83.
171
Id. at 384-85.
172
Id. at 385.
173
Id. at 384. That ruling followed the reasoning of Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. 553.
174
Act of Aug. 8, 1946, ch. 907, 60 Stat. 939. The intent of the Act was to settle once and
for all the claims arising from the government’s historical dealings with the Indians. The Act gave
the Commission jurisdiction over five kinds of claims: 1) those in law or equity arising under the
Constitution, laws, treaties of the United States; 2) all other claims in law and equity, including
168
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and determine all tribal grievances that had previously arisen. The Sioux
re-filed the Black Hills claim to that Commission.175 It was not until
1974, after another long period of procedural wrangling, that the
Commission ruled in favor of the Sioux. The Commission held the
claim was not barred by res judicata by the 1942 decision, as the
government had argued, and because Congress had acted pursuant to its
power of eminent domain when it passed the 1877 Act abrogating the
Fort Laramie Treaty, rather than as a trustee for the Sioux, the
government was obligated to pay just compensation.176 It was a taking
and not a mere exercise of the power of a trustee to transmute the nature
of the trust res, because Congress had made no effort to give the Sioux
full value for the ceded reservation lands. The only new obligation
assumed was a promise to provide the Sioux with subsistence rations,
but that obligation was subject to several limiting conditions. Also the
consideration given the Indians had no relationship to the value of the
property acquired and “there was no indication in the record that
Congress ever attempted to relate the value of the rations to the value of
the Black Hills.”177
On appeal, the Court of Claims agreed with the government that the
takings claim was barred by the res judicata effects of its 1942 decision
and reversed the Commission’s ruling on that point.178 This still left for
consideration the award due under the alternative claim, breach of
fiduciary duty, the ruling on which the government failed to appeal. The
Sioux would be entitled to damages, but no interest on those damages179

those sounding in tort; 3) claims which would result if the treaties, contracts and agreements
between the Indians and the United States were revised on the ground of fraud, duress,
unconscionable consideration, mutual or unilateral mistake, whether of law or fact, and any other
ground cognizable by a court of equity; 4) claims arising from a taking by the United States; and 5)
claims based upon fair and honorable dealings that were not recognized by any existing rule of law
or equity. The Commission was authorized to hear only those tribal claims that had accrued prior to
the enactment of the Act. § 12, 60 Stat. 1052 Neither a statute of limitations nor the defense of
laches was to apply to claims otherwise permissible under the Act. § 2, 60 Stat. 1050. Although the
Act did not explicitly limit recoveries to monetary awards, courts read in such a limitation. Seneca
Nation v. New York, 26 F. Supp. 2d 555, 573-74 (W.D. N.Y. 1998).
175
“The Commission initially ruled that the Sioux had failed to prove their case” but that
decision was vacated by the Court of Claims which directed the Commission to reopen the case for
consideration of additional evidence. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 385.
176
Id. at 385-86.
177
Id. at 386.
178
United States v. Sioux Nation, 518 F.2d 1298 (Claims 1975).
179
Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 387. The Court of Claims noted that by subsequent legislation,
“the Government would no longer be entitled to an offset from any judgment eventually awarded
the Sioux based on its appropriations for subsistence rations in the years following passage of the
1877 Act.” Id. at 387 n.1.
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(at least $17.5 million for the lands surrendered and for the gold taken by
trespassing prospectors prior to the 1877 Act).180
In 1978, Congress passed yet more legislation, this one providing
for Court of Claims’ review of the merits of the Sioux’ takings claim
without regard to the defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel
allowing for review of the merits de novo.181 Sitting en banc, the Court
of Claims, “affirmed the Commission’s holding that the 1877 Act
effected a taking of the Black Hills and of rights-of-way across the
reservation” which gave the Sioux the right to compensation with
interest.182 That award was five per cent, per annum, on the principal
sum of $17.1 million, dating from 1877.183
V. LEGAL AND EQUITABLE TIME BARS TO SPECIFIC RELIEF
“The Sioux did not claim that Congress was without power to take
the Black Hills . . . in contravention of the Fort Laramie Treaty, . . . [but]
only that [it] could not do so inconsistently with the command of the
Fifth Amendment to pay just compensation for the taking.”184 Still, the
Sioux have refused to accept the monetary award, insisting upon the
return of the land. This specific relief sought is impossible given the
substantive claim of a taking.185 In the case first mentioned in this paper,
180
Id. at 388; United States v. Sioux Nation 518 F.2d at 1302. “The court also remarked
upon President Grant’s duplicity in breaching the Government’s treaty obligation to keep
trespassers out of the Black Hills, and the pattern of duress practiced by the Government on the
starving Sioux to get them to agree to the sale of the Black Hills.” Id. “‘A more ripe and rank case
of dishonorable dealings will never, in all probability, be found in our history, which is not, taken as
a whole, the disgrace it now pleases some persons to believe.’” Id. The Sioux’ petition for
certiorari was denied. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 388. The case went back to the Indian Claims
Commission where the value of the rights of way obtained by the government through the 1877 Act
was determined to be $3,484. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 388.
181
Id. at 389. Pub. L. 95-243, 92 Stat. 153 (1978).
182
Id. at 389. The court reversed the ruling by the Commission that the mining by
prospectors prior to 1877 also constituted a taking, therefore “the value of gold [taken] could not be
considered as part of the principal on which interest would be paid to the Sioux.” Id. at 390 n.19.
183
Id. at 390. The Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 424. In so ruling, the Court approved the
lower court’s application of the good faith effort test: that in determining whether Congress has
acted in the capacity of a trustee having paramount power over the Sioux property (which would not
give rise to takings liability) or whether Congress was exercising its powers of eminent domain,
would be based on whether Congress made a good faith effort to give the Sioux full value of their
lands, thus merely transmuting the property from land to money, in which case, there would be no
taking. Id. at 416-17.
184
Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 411 n.27.
185
See generally, Yankton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 272 U.S. 351 (1926). There, the
Supreme Court refused to order rescission of a cession of land by the Sioux to the United States
where the United States had failed to perform as agreed. Id. Under a treaty, the Sioux ceded certain
lands, but reserved the “free and unrestricted use of the Red Pipe-Stone quarry, or so much thereof
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the Cayuga have alleged a wrongful dispossession by private parties in
violation of federal law and are seeking specific relief, which is not only
not impossible for the court to grant, but given the nature of the
substantive right involved, is the required remedy.
A. Specific Relief and Substitutionary Relief
Remedies have the basic goal of putting the plaintiff in the position
he would have been in had the injury not occurred. They are a means of
carrying into effect the substantive right. As a general proposition, the
remedy for a particular injury should reflect the right and the policy
behind that right as precisely as possible. The proposition is said to
apply to both the selection of a remedy and to its measurement and, if
justice is to be done, a court in formulating the right remedy must
understand the nature and scope of the substantive right as well as the
substantive law and policy. The two broad choices lay before a court:
specific relief and substitutionary relief.186 While specific relief, in
which the thing originally lost or bargained for is restored, may often be
the preferred form, it may be impossible for the court to grant, say, if the
thing sought to be recovered has been consumed or destroyed, is no
longer under the defendant’s control, or involved the performance of
some act by the defendant. Substitutionary relief, in the form of
as they have been accustomed to frequent and use for the purpose of procuring stone for pipes; and
the United States . . . keep it open and free to the Indians to visit and procure stone for pipes so long
as they shall desire.” Id. at 353-54. Whether by these provisions the Sioux acquired full ownership
of the tract was in question for some time, the United States collecting and awarding to the Sioux
damages for a taking of the strip for railroad purposes and later constructing an Indian industrial
school on it. Id. at 354. More than thirty years after the first treaty, the Sioux made a cession of an
additional 150,000 acres of land. Id. at 354-55. In part consideration of the cession, the agreement
provided that if the government questioned the ownership of the Pipestone Reservation by the Sioux
under the earlier treaty, the Secretary of the Interior should as speedily as possible refer the matter
to the Supreme Court to be decided and the Secretary’s failure to do so within one year after the
ratification of this later treaty, would be construed as a waiver by the United States of all rights to
the ownership of the Pipestone Reservation. Id. at 355. The Secretary made no attempt to refer the
matter and the Attorney General later advised that compliance would be impracticable. Id. A few
years later, Congress believing that title had vested in the Sioux directed the Secretary to negotiate
with the Sioux for the purchase of the land. Id. at 355. An agreement was negotiated but a
congressional committee recommended against it. Id. at 356. The Sioux sued for compensation for
the misappropriation. Id. The Supreme Court upheld the claim, rejecting the defense of
impossibility (because the matter could not be referred to the Supreme Court) inasmuch as the
agreement provided for an alternative consequence (vesting in fee in the Indians). Id. While the
Sioux did not expressly seek recovery of the land, the court stated “[i]t is impossible, however, to
rescind the cession and restore the Indians to their former rights because the lands have been opened
to settlement and large portions of them are now in the possession of innumerable innocent
purchasers. . . .” Id. at 357.
186
1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 1 (2d ed. 1993).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol36/iss2/2

34

Green: Specific Relief for Ancient Deprivations of Property
GREEN1.DOC

2003]

3/19/03 3:15 PM

SPECIFIC RELIEF FOR ANCIENT DEPRIVATIONS OF PROPERTY

279

damages, that is, monetary compensation, may be all that is within the
court’s practical power. This is often the case in breach of contract
actions, where damages are awarded for loss of bargain and are
calculated to make the injured party whole in an economic sense.187
The loss to the injured party is considered a fungible thing in the
sense that money is deemed capable of providing full relief by satisfying
the economic objective of the contract or giving the injured party the
resources deemed sufficient to go out into the marketplace to find a
suitable replacement for the thing that was the object of the original
contract. Where the loss is not a fungible thing, damages may be
inadequate. This is often the case with a contract for the purchase of real
property, where courts usually will grant specific performance rather
than damages for breach, on the premise that every parcel of real
property is unique.188 In the same vein, one who already owns land, but
who has been wrongfully dispossessed usually will seek and be granted
the specific relief of being restored to possession and to have the court
officially recognize and declare his title (as well as to recover damages
for the use value of the land during the period of the dispossession). The
traditional method for achieving these forms of relief is the action in
ejectment.189
The importance of the cause of action of ejectment and its
predecessor causes190 in the English common law property system
cannot be overstated. It would not be out of line to say that it was
required as the fulfillment of the idea of property. As the Supreme Court
put it:
The common law of England was . . . as it still is . . . that a right to
land, by that law, includes the right to enter on it, when the possession
is withheld from the right owner; to recover possession by suit.*** [A]
law which denies to the owner of land a remedy to recover possession
of it, when withheld by any person, however innocently he may have
obtained it . . . impairs his right to, and interest in, the property. If
187

11 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 992 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 1979) (2002).
This premise has been questioned by courts. See, e.g., Centex Homes Corp. v. Boag, 320
A.2d 194 (N.J. Super. 1974).
189
At one time, a plaintiff was required to bring a separate suit for damages which were
traditionally called mesne profits. The second action is not now required and the damages claim can
be asserted in the ejectment action.
190
MILSOM, supra note 53, at 137. The action in ejectment made its first appearance in the
16th century as an action available to leaseholders, but later extended to freeholders, thereby
replacing the ancient and cumbersome real actions of writ of right, assize of novel disseisin, writ of
entry and assize of mort d’ancestor, which all gave possessory remedies. Id. at 124-49. See also F.
W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds.,
Cambridge University Press, 1962) (1909).
188
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there be no remedy to recover possession, the law necessarily
presumes a want of right to it.191

Protecting possession, the law affirms ownership.192 As to
aboriginal title, which is possession, the Supreme Court has recognized
an unquestionable right by its holders to maintain an action in ejectment
to recover lands covered by that title.193
B. Time Bars
Though the law provides protection to possession, protection is
only available when it is sought and is not precluded by defenses a
defendant may set up, such as the running of the statute of limitations.
Defenses, like causes of action, arise in forms that are either legal or
equitable,194 and while in a single civil action, legal and equitable
defenses may be combined, the defining character of a defense still has
significance in the law.195 Equitable defenses, as the characterization
suggests, exist solely by virtue of equitable principles, and originally
were recognized only by courts of equity. Generally, in actions that are
wholly legal, an equitable defense may not be set up to defeat a strictly
legal cause.196 The defendant’s assertion of an equitable defense does
not change the character of the action or abridge the plaintiff’s rights.197
191

Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 74-76 (1823) (involving a writ of right).
Possession from ownership means the right to exclude. Blackstone grandly defined the
right of property as “that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the
external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 2. Two centuries later, the Supreme Court would
describe the right to exclude as the essential feature of property. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
193
Marsh v. Brooks, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 223 (1850); see also Oneida Indian Nation v. Oneida,
414 U.S. 661, 666 (1974). Incidental to that right to ejectment is the right to an accounting of all
rents, issues and profits against trespassers and wrongful possessors. United States v. Santa Fe
Pacific R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339 (1941); Fellows v. Blacksmith, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 366 (1856)
(discussing an action for trespass based upon recognized title); Creek Nation v. United States, 318
U.S. 629, 640 (1943) (determining that Indian tribes have an extrastatutory, “general legal right . . .
to bring actions on their own behalf to collect unpaid rents on tribal lands).
194
JOHN N. POMEROY, 4 EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1368, 1369 (4th ed. 1919).
195
Edward Yorio, A Defense of Equitable Defenses, 51 OHIO STATE LAW J. 1201 (1990).
196
Oneida v. Oneida Indian Tribe, 470 U.S. at 245; United States v. Robbins, 819 F. Supp.
672 (E.D. Mi. 1993) (stating that laches, as a general rule, remains inapplicable to legal claims for
damages); Golotrade Shipping & Chartering, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 706 F. Supp. 214, 220
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); DOBBS, REMEDIES at § 2.3(1).
197
Dunbar v. Green, 198 U.S. 166, 170 (1905); See also Sun Oil Co. v. Fleming, 469 F.2d
211, 214 (2d Cir. 1972). The court stated: “[I]t is the rule that if the law affords a remedy and that
remedy is adequate, the cause may not be made the basis of a suit in equity. The gravamen of . . .
[the] claim is its demand for possession. . . . The legal action of ejectment is the proper remedy for
the recovery of possession under such circumstances. . . . It follows that the equitable defense of
192
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As it relates to the issues discussed here, despite a defendant’s assertion
of an equitable claim or defense, ejectment, an action at law brought by
the plaintiff, must be tried at law. In actions at law, whether a right
holder has delayed too long in asserting the claim is determined by the
words of a statute of limitation. If an action is brought the day before
the statutory time expires, it will be sustained; if a day after, it will be
defeated. Thus laches, an equitable time bar, established by the “neglect
to assert a right or claim which, taken together with lapse of time and
other circumstances caus[es] prejudice to [the] adverse party,”198cannot
defeat plaintiff’s legal claim. Conversely, where a right holder seeks
equitable relief, that relief may be barred because of delay depending
upon the circumstances of each particular case.199 Large conflicts of
policy and pragmatism arise if laches, a judge-made defense, is allowed
to operate without regard to the statute of limitations. One of the large
policy conflicts is that a statute of limitation reflects the judgment of
lawmakers as to what is a reasonable time within which to assert a right
and the most desirable ends sought by the allowance of that prescribed
period. The operative fiction is that because equity acts in personam,
enjoining a party to do what in conscience is right, does not interfere
with law, and hence does not disturb the underlying legislative
judgments. But it is a fiction if a particular plaintiff otherwise within her
rights, because of equity’s injunction, is denied those rights and benefits
of law.
Yet, to some, the question remains whether laches, where it cannot
bar the legal action, can bar a request for specific legal relief. In other
words, does the inapplicability of the statute of limitations and laches to
a cause of action also mean that they cannot bar a particular relief?
Alternatively, if no time bar applies to the right holder, so as to preclude
the action in either law or equity, is the application of laches to bar
laches cannot prevail.” Id. See further, United States v. Nix, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1591 (N.D.
Cal. 1995) (holding that non-Indian who had no right to occupy Indian land, subject to ejectment);
Banner v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 568, 576 (1999) (involving 3000 individual lessees, whose 99
year leases on Indian land had expired, but not renewed, were unlawfully on the land and therefore
subject to ejectment; the court rejecting the suggestion of a property right to renew the leases), aff’d
Banner v. United States 238 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (concerning situations where lease amounts
were nominal, between one and ten dollars annually and did not increase over the entire 99 year
term).
198
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 875 (6th ed. 1990); see also Noble v. Gallardo, 223 U.S. 65,
66 (1912) (holding that change of position on the faith of other party’s aquiesence along with lapse
of time required for laches).
199
Patterson v. Hewitt, 195 U.S. 309, 317 (1904) (affirming denial of equitable relief on the
basis of laches, even though the limitations period, which by statute was applicable to actions in
both law and equity, had not expired).
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specific legal relief the same as barring the action? The answer to both
questions should be yes. If the cause of action by its definition calls for
one form of legal relief, denying that relief is the same as barring the
action. If the action cannot be barred because the statute of limitations
and laches do not apply, the claimants must be granted the specific legal
relief demanded. In this respect, the Cayuga decision,200denying the
claimant’s specific demands of ejectment, was wrong.
These conclusions are particularly compelling when the right holder
is a sovereign. The basis for this position begins with a consideration of
the common law principle “nullum tempus occurrit regi,”201 that neither
laches nor statutes of limitations will bar the sovereign.202 Courts
adopted the rule, not on the theory that an “impeccable” sovereign could
not be guilty of laches, but because of the public policies served by the
doctrine, in particular, the public interest in preserving public rights and
property from injury and loss attributable to the negligence of public
officers and agents, through whom the public must act.203 The policy
has particular meaning in the case of lands held in trust for the public,
the interests of the sovereign are so widespread and varied, that the
vigilance required in protecting rights of private parties is hindered. Yet
the public must not lose its rights because of the constraints on the
sovereign.
If a contrary rule were sanctioned, it would only be necessary for
intruders upon the public lands to maintain their possessions, until the
statute of limitations shall run; and then they would become invested
with the title against the government, and all persons claiming under
it. . . . It is only necessary, therefore, to state the case, in order to show
the wisdom and propriety of the rule that the statute never operates
against the government.204

No matter how much time has passed, the federal government as
well as state sovereigns cannot be precluded from recovering their lands
from wrongful possessors.205 Similarly, in the case of aboriginal lands,
200

No. 80-CV-930, 80-CV-960, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10579 (N.D.N.Y. 1999), at * 98-99.
“No time runs against the King.”
202
Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 294 (1982) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
203
Id.
204
Lindsey v. Lessee of Miller, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 666, 673 (1832); accord, Guaranty Trust Co.
v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 133 (1938); Weber v. Bd. of Harbor Comm’rs, 85 U.S. 57 (1873);
United States v. Knight, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 301, 314 (1840); quoted in Block, 461 U.S. at 295
(O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also Texas v. Louisiana, 410 U.S. 702 (1973); Armstrong v. Morrill,
81 U.S. 120 (1871).
205
Illinois v. Kentucky, 500 U.S. 380, 388 (1991) (noting that laches defense is generally
inapplicable against a state); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 484 (1988). The
201
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the centuries that have passed do not bar an assertion of a claim to
ownership of lands wrongfully possessed by others. There is no statute
of limitations to preclude actions initiated by Indian Tribes to establish
title to, or the right of possession to, real or personal property. The
federal statute that prescribes a limitations period for certain actions for
money damages brought by the United States on behalf of recognized
Indian tribes,206 expressly excludes from its coverage actions for title
brought Indian tribes.207 Aboriginal land rights are founded in federal
common law. Thus, under principles of constitutional supremacy state
law time bars, adverse possession rules and equitable principles of
laches cannot apply of their own force to debar them.208 The normal rule
of borrowing of an analogous state rule in the absence of a controlling
federal limitations rule cannot apply either because that would be
inconsistent with the federal policy that Indian land claims not be limited
by time.209 In its freedom from time bars, aboriginal title corresponds to
title held by a sovereign.210
Court accepted the ruling by the state supreme court that “[t]he fact that petitioners have long been
the record title holders, or long paid taxes on these lands does not change the outcome . . . [T]he
State’s ownership of these lands could not be lost via adverse possession, laches, or any equitable
doctrine.” Id. The case involved 42 acres underlying a river and 11 small drainage streams; the
disputed tracts ranged from under one-half to almost ten acres. Id. at 472. See generally,
Annotation, Acquisition by adverse possession or use of public property held by municipal
corporations or other governmental unit otherwise than for streets, alleys, parks, or common, 55
A.L.R.2d 554 (1957).
206
28 U.S.C. § 2415.
207
28 U.S.C. § 2415(c).
208
Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 240 (1985) (“Oneida II”); Board of
County Comm’rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 350-51 (1939) (defenses based on delay in
bringing claims such as laches and estoppel are inapplicable to claims to enforce Indian rights);
Swim v. Bergland, 696 F. 2d 712, 718 (9th Cir. 1983) (neither laches nor estoppel is available to
defeat Indian treaty rights); Oneida Nation v. Sherrill, 145 F.Supp. 2d 226 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (laches
would not bar suit by Indians or by the United States on behalf of Indians to protect their rights to
their lands and federal policy that preclude laches also precludes waiver and estoppel defenses);
Oneida Indian Nation v. Oneida, 434 F. Supp. 527, 542 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (laches would not bar the
suit); Seneca Nation v. New York, 26 F. Supp. 2d 555, 572-73 (W.D.N.Y. 1998)(laches not a bar to
Indian land claims, citing Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 691 F.2d 1070, 1084 (2d Cir. 1982),
as rejecting all delay-based defenses founded on federal law).
209
Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 240. Indeed, “[i]n adopting the statute that gave jurisdiction over
civil actions involving Indians to the New York courts, Congress included” a proviso that the act
should not be “construed as conferring jurisdiction on the Courts of the State of New York or
making applicable the laws of the state of New York” on actions “involving Indian lands or claims
with respect thereto.” Id. at 241. That proviso was “added specifically to ensure that the New York
statute of limitations would not apply to pre-1952 land claims.” Id.
210
In fact, Indian Tribes from our earliest history, have been regarded as “domestic
dependent nations” that exercise inherent sovereign authority over their members and territories.”
Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band of Potawatoni Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991)
(quoting Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (5 Pet. 1) (1831)). “Suits against Indian are thus
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While the general rule is that time bars do not apply to a sovereign.
Some cases, though, make a distinction between lands held by a
sovereign in a proprietary capacity and as trustee. In the former, time
may run against the sovereign.211 As to the Indians’ right of occupancy,
the national sovereign is said to hold the fee simple title,212 holding
Indian lands in trust for them.213 Yet, as a kind of paradox, that trustee
has the power to extinguish the Indians’ right in those lands without
consequent liability for compensation.214 Although if the sovereign fails
barred by sovereign immunity absent a clear waiver by the tribe or congressional abrogation.” Id. at
509 (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978)). There was a longstanding
history of treaty making with the Indians and treaties entered into with the Indians were on the same
level as treaties entered into with other foreign nations. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832). See Kristen A. Carpenter, Symposium: Native American Sovereignty Issues: Interpreting
Indian Country in State of Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 35 TULSA L.J. 73, 96 (1999). For
some time, the federal trust responsibility was used to justify Congressional power over Indians. In
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886), on the basis of the guardianship theory, the Court
confirmed Congress’ “plenary” power over Indians. Id. Later it established and protected rights of
Indian tribes and individuals, to the extent it requires the fulfillment by Congress of obligations to
Indians, the application of the Indian canons in interpreting treaties, statutes and other lawmaking
affecting Indians, and the evaluation of the conduct of executive agencies under strict fiduciary
standards. Cohen, supra note 111, at 49; United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391 (1973); Seminole
Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942); United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111
(1938); Navajo Nation v. United States, 263 F.3d 1325, 1329-41 (Fed Cir. 2001), discussing United
States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980) (Mitchell I); United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983)
(Mitchell II); Brown v. United States, 86 F.3d 1554 (Fed Cir. 1996); See also Cohen, supra note 55,
at 49. Carpenter, supra at 127, asserts that this conception of Indians as dependent and as wards
was entirely Eurocentric and a handy tool for subjugation. It cast Indians as non-actors, incapable of
managing their own affairs, which thus determined the federal government’s approach to Indian
affairs, despite real evidence of economic enterprise, vital governments, and thriving cultural
practices. Id. . . . In fact, “‘wardship’ is not now, and may have never been, an accurate description
of Indians’ status in relation to the federal government.” Id. It may be understood “as an example
of the ‘patriarchal terminology that white Americans [of Chief Justice Marshall’s] generation
typically used in translating the language of Indian forest diplomacy.’” Id. “[D]uring the past
several centuries, the tribes and the federal government have been dependent on one another in
ways that ‘ward’ and ‘guardian’ do not capture.” Id. Carpenter argues for “Indigenous Indian
Law,” as an “attempt to identify existing and developing theories and practices which indigenous
peoples can use to address their legal problems. . . . ‘[A] sound contemporary Indian policy must
recognize that the Indian way is very much alive and well.’” Id. at 115-16.
211
See Weber v. Bd. of Harbor Comm’rs, 85 U.S. 57, 68 (1873) (“Where lands are held by
the State simply for sale or other disposition, and not as sovereign in trust for the public, there is
some reasons in requiring the assertion of her rights within a limited period”); American Trading
Real Estate Prop., Inc. v. Trumbull, 574 A.2d 796 (Conn. 1990); Devins v. Bogota, 592 A.2d 199
(N.J. 1991); Siejack v. Baltimore, 313 A.2d 843 (Md. 1974).
212
Cohen, supra, note 55.
213
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886). The federal government-Indian
relationship in respect of their lands is regarded as that of “trustee-ward.” Although the
philosophical foundations of this relationship is somewhat unclear, the first judicial expression of it
appears in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) (1831).
214
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
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to carry out its obligations as trustee, it can be liable to damages.215
Because the sovereign is not free to deal in aboriginal lands without
accountability, but is obligated, at least until aboriginal title is
extinguished, to hold those lands in good faith in the Indians’ interest,
the exception to the principle of nullum tempus occurrit regi (regarding
lands held by the sovereign in a proprietary capacity) should not
apply.216 Accordingly, that radical fee simple title held by the national
sovereign, subject to the Indians’ right of occupancy, must to the same
extent and for the same reasons be exempt from time bars.
The Supreme Court said as much in Heckman v. United States,217
where as to lands that had been allotted to individual tribal members, the
Court ruled that the protection of Indian lands involved public, not
merely private, rights. The government had sought and was permitted to
seek the cancellation of some 30,000 conveyances, affecting some
16,000 defendants because they were of Cherokee lands that by statute
were inalienable. As guardians for the Indians, it was the duty of the
government to enforce by all appropriate means the restrictions designed
for the security of the Indians.218 The Court explained that a transfer of
the allotments was not simply a violation of the proprietary rights of the
Indians, but also a “violation of the rights of the United States. . . .
Indeed, the essence of the right of the United States to interfere in the . . .
case [was] its obligation to protect the public from the monopoly of the
patent which was procured by fraud.”219
In Board of County Commr’s v. United States,220 the Court also
described Indians’ land rights as federal rights, which a state would not
215

Sioux Nation v. United States, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
It is also the largely held view that lands held by a sovereign, e.g., state, which by its
constitution or a statute, is precluded from alienating state lands, cannot be acquired by adverse
possession while the state holds title to them. See e.g., Smith v. People, 193 N.Y.S.2d 127 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1959); Binghamton v. Monserrate, 419 N.Y.S.2d 253 (‘N.Y. App. Div. 1979);
Tonawanda v. Ellicott Creek Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 449 N.Y.S.2d 116 (‘N.Y. App. Div. 1982);
Hinkley v. State, 137 N.E. 599 (N.Y. 1922); People v. Douglass, 216 N.Y.S. 785 (N.Y. App. Div.
1926); People v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 179 Cal. 537, 147 P. 274 (Cal. 1915).
217
224 U.S. 413 (1912).
218
Id. at 437.
219
Id. at 438-39. The Court discussed, among others, in support of its ruling United States v.
Rickert, 188 U.S. 432, 444 (1903), where it was pointed out that in a suit by the government to
restrain the collection of certain county taxes on structures on Indian lands, “the decision [finding a
sufficient governmental interest to maintain the suit] rested upon a broader foundation than the mere
holding of a legal title to land in trust, and embraced the recognition of the interest of the United
States in securing immunity to the Indians from taxation conflicting with the measures it had
adopted for their protection. Heckman, 224 U.S. at 441. The United States was entitled to recover
without compensation to the displaced landowners. Id.
220
308 U.S. 343.
216
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be allowed to infringe. In protecting these rights, “federal courts [were]
not restricted to the remedies available in state courts in enforcing such
federal rights . . . . and [s]tate [law] notions of laches and state statutes of
limitations [had] no applicability to suits by the Government, whether on
behalf of Indians or otherwise.”221
Speaking on the applicability of laches to a claim brought directly
by the Oneida where there was a 175 year delay in asserting the claim,
the Supreme Court said in Oneida II:222
[The] application of the equitable defense of laches in an action at law
would be novel indeed. . . . [T]he equitable doctrine of laches,
developed and designed to protect good-faith transactions against those
who have slept on their rights, with knowledge and ample opportunity
to assert them, cannot properly have application to give vitality to a
void deed and to bar the rights of Indian wards in land subject to
statutory restrictions.223

To bar ejectment and hence specific relief, on the basis of laches
would be tantamount to an extinguishment of aboriginal title, and thus
contrary to the requirement that an extinguishment of Indian title reflect
a clear and intentional sovereign act.224 The Court concluded: “it is
221

Id. at 350-51.
470 U.S. 226 (1985). There, the Oneida Indian Nation of New York, the Oneida Indian
Nation of Wisconsin and the Oneida of the Thames Band Council sued the Counties of Oneida and
Madison, New York, for damages representing the fair rental value of the land when it was
occupied by the defendants. Id. at 229. The plaintiffs’ ancestors had conveyed 100,000 acres to the
State of New York under a 1795 agreement that violated the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1793
(Non-Intercourse Act), such that the transaction was void. Id. In 1795, the State of New York
entered into the agreement at issue with the Oneidas whereby they conveyed virtually all of their
remaining land to the State for annual cash payments. Id. at 232. While there is a statute of
limitations that applies to certain claims brought by the United States on behalf of Indians, that
statute specifically excludes all actions “to establish the title to, or right of possession of, real or
personal property.” Id. at 242, citing 28 U.S.C. § 2415(c).
223
Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 245 n.16, quoting Ewert v. Bluejacket, 259 U.S. 129 (1922). In
Ewert, the Court upheld the granting of specific relief for the recovery of aboriginal lands despite
the passage of decades and despite the transfer of title to otherwise good faith purchasers where the
possessors’ claim rested upon a deed that was void because it purported to convey Indian land to a
government official in violation of a statute that made it unlawful for him to become a purchaser of
Indian lands while holding that position. Id. In general, where Congress declares certain contracts
void, it intends that the customary legal incidence of voidness will follow, including possible
specific relief. See, e.g., Bunch v. Cole, 264 U.S. 250, 254 (1923) (“[L]eases made in violation of a
congressional prohibition . . . [and are] not merely voidable at the election of the allottee, but
absolutely void and not susceptible of ratification”); Danforth v. Wear, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 673, 67576 (1824) (“As to lands surveyed within the Indian boundary, this Court has never hesitated to
consider all such surveys and grants as wholly void. . . .”); United States v. Southern Pac. Transp.
Co., 543 F.2d 676, 698 (9th Cir. 1976) (“To give effect to an invalid attempt to convey an interest in
tribal lands in violation of the statute . . . would undermine [the] [statute’s] purpose.”).
224
Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 245, citing United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 439 (1926),
222
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[therefore] questionable whether laches properly could be applied.”225
The Court continued, where the basis for the wrongfulness of the
dispossession continued, such as where it is in violation of a statutory
restraint on alienation (there and in Cayuga), the application of laches
would appear to be inconsistent with the established federal policy, as
much as the borrowing of state statutes of limitation would be.226
To return then to the question originally posed, although stated
slightly different, can laches apply to bar a demand for specific legal
relief when there is no statute of limitations to bar the action? In the
case of property held by a sovereign in trust for the public, the answer is
clearly no. This should also be the answer in the case of aboriginal title,
whose radical title is held by the sovereign in trust for Indian nations.
quoting United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 45-47 (1913).
225
Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 245 n.16.
226
Id. Justice Stevens dissented in Oneida II, believing that laches could bar the Indians’
claim to recover their land. Id. at 255. He pointed out that inasmuch as the President of the United
States assured the Chief of the Senecas that “federal law would securely protect Seneca lands from
acquisition by any State or person,” a 175 year delay in bringing suit to avoid a 1795 conveyance
was inexcusable. Id. To Justice Stevens, in the “absence of any evidence of deception,
concealment, or interference with the Tribe’s right to assert a claim.” Id. Societal interests that
always underlie statutes of repose—particularly when title to real property were at stake and should
have barred the claim. Id. at 255-56. In disagreement with the rule applied, he thought that a state
statute of limitations could not be considered ‘“inconsistent’” with federal policy “merely because
the statute causes the plaintiff to lose the litigation.” Id. at 258. But, this is a difficult proposition if
the effect of a state law is to preclude the right guaranteed by federal law. Oneida II, 470 U.S. at
258. While he thought “that the equitable doctrine of laches, with its focus on legitimate reliance
and inexcusable delay, best reflect[ed] the limitations principles that would have governed this
ancient claim at common law—without requiring a historian’s inquiry into archaic limitation
doctrines that would have governed the—claims at any specific time in the preceding two
centuries.” Id. at 261. He also recognized “the application of a traditional equitable defense in an
action at law [was] something of a novelty.” Id. at 261-62. Believing some sort of time bar should
apply, Justice Stevens pointed out that an equitable defense was less harsh than a straightforward
application of a statute of limitations. Id. at 262. Justice Stevens stated because the claim was
based in federal common law, not statute, there was no risk of frustrating the will of the legislature.
Id. at 262. But, here too, Justice Stevens ignores congressional judgment in exempting such claims
from the statute of limitations applicable to the government. Justice Stevens was highly critical of
the Indians, making much of the fact that they “plainly knew or should have known that they had
conveyed their lands . . . in violation of federal law,” yet did nothing for 175 years.” Id. at 269.
That they had had enough time to grow up and indeed had having learned English, developed a
sophisticated system of tribal government, having petitioned to government for the redress of
grievances. The difficulty with this position is determining that point between 1795 and 1980 at
which that they should have brought suit and beyond which they would be barred. 1820? 1920?
The lower courts have found as “a special reason why the Indians’ property may not be lost through
adverse possession, laches or delay,” the Nonintercourse Act, “which forbids the acquisition of
Indian lands or of any title or claim thereto except by treaty or convention.” United States v.
Ahtanum Irrigation, 236 F.2d 321, 334 (9th Cir. 1956). In general, federal government is not
subject to defenses of laches or estoppel. See also Oneida Nation v. Sherrill, 145 F. Supp. 2d 226
(N.D.N.Y. 2001).
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Because the statute of limitations and laches do not apply, specific relief
must be granted.227 The reasons for these conclusions are plain. Barring
the demand for specific legal relief would wholly nullify aboriginal title,
thus defeating public policy. This would also create a truly anomalous
result. The federal government, on its own seeking to vindicate the
Indian Tribes’ interest in exclusive possession of their lands, could at
any time obtain specific legal relief through ejectment, but the Indian
Tribes, in a suit on their own seeking to vindicate the exact interest,
could be denied the same relief on the basis of laches. If the sovereign
could not be barred, to debar the holders of the possessory title seeking
to vindicate the identical interest would mean denying a remedy solely
on the basis of who the plaintiff is. It is no answer that Indians might
still have available a declaration of their title at any time, unaffected by
laches, as the federal statute228 permits. Because that declaration would
be meaningless if the land covered by the title cannot be recovered and
that title is only about possession in the first place.
VI. A FLAWED ANALYSIS AND RESULT
The Cayuga court, in formulating the appropriate remedy for the
wrongful taking of possession of aboriginal lands, chose to apply the
Restatement of Torts factors for redressing trespass, and not rules for
ejectment. In its effort to find the right course, the district court seemed
to labor in the dark, although it need not have, as the cases just discussed
would have been illuminating. In its search, the court found only one
useful decision, United States v. Imperial Irrigation,229 from the Central
District of California, which also denied the plaintiff the specific relief
of ejectment. But the reason ejectment was denied in Imperial Irrigation
was because the plaintiff there did not plead it.230 That court explained
227
Brooks v. Nez Perce County, 670 F.2d 835, 837 (9th Cir. 1982) (granting specific relief
despite a 35 year delay). Another court in the same district relied on Oneida II to reject a laches
defense by the government in the Seneca’s action in ejectment against the current possessors of land
the Senecas alleged was taken from them by the state in violation of the Nonintercourse Act.
Seneca Nation v. New York, 26 F. Supp. 2d 555, 573 (1998). That court also relied on a Second
Circuit opinion, Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 691 F.2d 1070, 1084 (2d Cir. 1982), which also
rejected all “delay-based defenses” founded on federal law.” (This case was not directly related to
the Oneida II line of cases.)
228
28 U.S.C. § 2415.
229
799 F. Supp. 1052 (S.D. Cal. 1992).
230
799 F. Supp. at 1068. There, on its own behalf and on behalf of the Torres-Martinez Band
of Mission Indians, the government sued two water districts for continuing trespass, occurring over
the course of 68 years when irrigation water that drained from defendant’s water project flowed into
an inland salt water lake, raising the water level of that lake and flooding tribal lands. Id. at 1056.
While the complaint alleged trespass and sought an injunction, at trial, plaintiffs asked for
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that when properly pleaded, ejectment is a cause of action available to a
plaintiff who could not sue for trespass because he had been wrongfully
dispossessed. In Imperial Irrigation, the cause of action was not
available to the tribe because they were still in possession. What
Imperial Irrigation was saying was that ejectment is not the remedy for
trespass, which was what the pleadings and facts there had established.
In contrast, in Cayuga, the plaintiffs have been dispossessed and have
stated a cause of action in ejectment. Thus, while Imperial Irrigation
correctly denied ejectment on the grounds and facts recited, it was not
correct for Cayuga, to deny ejectment on the basis of Imperial Irrigation
when the facts of the two cases were opposition.
The Imperial Irrigation court went on to treat the plaintiffs’ claim
as a request for a permanent injunction against trespass and analyzed the
cause under factors suggested by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, for
determining the appropriateness of an injunction against trespass.231 As
a predicate for that position, the court stated that “there [was] precedent
for applying equitable factors and thereby limiting relief otherwise
available for Indian claims.”232 The court cited two cases in support.
First, there was Brooks v. Nez Perce County, but the ruling there was not
nearly so broad as Imperial Irrigation supposed.233 Rather, in Brooks,
the Ninth Circuit held that laches could be weighed by a court in the
calculation of damages to the extent that a portion of them could be said
to have resulted from the government’s fault where it delayed over 54
years in bringing a claim on behalf of the Indians. Nonetheless, the
court in Brooks granted to the plaintiffs the specific relief they sought,
quiet title, despite the delay.234 Imperial Irrigation also cited Oneida II,
but only a dissenting opinion235 on an issue not decided by the Court.236
These analytical stretches by Imperial Irrigation make the Cayuga
court’s reliance on it unsound.
In Cayuga, the district court gave consideration to two other cases,
United States v. Boylan,237 and United States v. Brewer.238 Although

ejectment. Id. That remedy was denied, the court said, because ejectment is “a discrete cause of
action. . . ,” which the plaintiffs had not “pled, briefed or proven.” Id. at 1068.
231
Those factors are discussed infra note 256 and accompanying text.
232
Imperial, 799 F. Supp. at 1068.
233
670 F.2d 835, 837 (9th Cir. 1982).
234
Id. at 837. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2415, a statute of limitations operates against the
government seeking monetary damages.
235
See discussion of Justice Stevens’ dissent supra note 226 and accompanying text.
236
799 F. Supp. at 1068.
237
265 F. 165 (2d Cir. 1920).
238
184 F. Supp. 377 (D.N.M. 1960).
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both of those courts granted the specific relief the plaintiffs sought,
ejectment, the Cayuga court distinguished them, in ways that were not
entirely credible.239 Cayuga first suggested that ejectment was granted in
the other cases because the conveyances on which the defendants’
possession was founded were declared void.240 However, this could not
be a point of distinction. This is because the root of title acquired by the
defendant state in Cayuga was in violation of federal law, making the
titles in all the possessors there likewise void.241 The court added that
Boylan and Brewer did not involve land claim litigation. But as is
apparent from what the plaintiffs in those cases sought, the recovery of
land, the court’s suggestion can only be described as a pretense.
In the end, the court found the difference to be in the amount of
land involved—some 65,000 acres in Cayuga, compared to only 32
acres in Boylan and a mere .485 in Brewer, and in the amount of time
the current possessors had been in possession, in Brewer and Boylan,
“not . . . long.”242 The court described these as “critical distinctions,”“
which could not be ignored,243 that “justice requires that “equitable
factors . . . be carefully weighed before any relief [was] granted.”244
Applying the same logic, if these factors are not accepted as “critical
distinctions,” as they are hard to perceive them as such, then the use of
such factors as for determining whether to grant a permanent injunction
against trespass to resolve a claim of ejectment, is false and unjust.
The court’s reasoning regarding the application of the Restatement
factors was otherwise skewed. In the first place, the expectations and
innocence of the current possessors were valued, but the same in the
Cayuga were not. While acknowledging the impact of the loss of
homeland on the Cayuga’s culture and society, the court nonetheless
pointed out that current possessors were blameless. At the same time,
the court also did not identify equally weighty losses on the part of the
current possessors as would countervail the innocence of the Cayuga.
239
They also cited United States v. Santa Fe Pacific R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339 (1941). The
district court distinguished that case on the basis that it did not speak to the issue of ejectment, but
an accounting for trespass. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo, No. 80-CV-930, 80-CV-960, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10579, at *68.
240
Id. at *69-70.
241
See discussion of Nonintercourse Act, supra note 147-50 and accompanying text.
242
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10579, at *71.
243
Id.
244
Id. at *72. The court stated that it “[did] not find convincing the Cayugas’ arguments
opposing an equitable based analysis of ejectment” and pointed out that the “Cayugas [did] not offer
an alternative way of analyzing the ejectment issue, other than to assert that they are entitled to that
remedy.” Id. But, the Cayuga did, that is, with settled principles, particularly those expressed in the
cases already. Id.
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Although the court found the Cayuga’s goal of reclaiming their
homeland to be laudable, it thought a monetary award would accomplish
this goal by enabling the Cayuga to purchase individual lots out of its
original lands back from the wrongful possessors.245 But would that
establish a homeland?
The court also resolved the issue of unreasonable delay against the
Cayuga, even though the court found that some delay by the Cayugas in
bringing suit excusable, due to the absence of a legal forum in which
they could have asserted the claim for most of the period of their
dispossession. At first, the court noted, there was no forum for lodging
such a claim, and it was not cognizable until 1972, then there were
settlement negotiations, then suit.246
The court determined that even though the Cayuga chose and
argued for ejectment, monetary damages would produce results equally
satisfactory. There was no consideration by the court whether monetary
damages (from the state defendant) to the current possessors would be
equally satisfactory to them (who in any case have no legal title that
could be the basis for any claim against the Cayuga). Generally, in
property law there is a presumption of uniqueness. Nevertheless, the
court put the burden on the Cayuga to prove that their land was “so
unique . . . that the objectives, . . . economic, political and cultural
development, cannot be reached without ejecting thousands upon
thousands of landowners.”247 There was no parallel burden placed on
the current possessors.
Because thousands of individuals and several public utilities could
be displaced, the court reasoned that ejectment had to be denied, because
“two wrongs don’t make a right.”248 In the legal sense, specific relief in
ejectment is not a wrong, but a correction of one. Putting aside the
question of whether the court was free to consider ejectment under the
circumstances in the moral sense, it would be a hard case for a new
purchaser (as many of the defendants likely are) to show that his
entitlement is greater than the rights of the original possessor. Surely,
the intentional wrongdoers (the state), who constructed the electrical and
transportation infrastructure, do not occupy that higher plane.249
245

Id. at *75.
Under the fourth factor, related misconduct, the court found the only thing worthy of
consideration was attributable to the State and federal governments not the individual defendants
and none on the part of the Cayuga. Id. at *89.
247
Id. at *81.
248
Id. at *91.
249
Under prevailing principles, they would not even be entitled to an adjustment. The
district court took note of testimony about the effect ejectment would have on the area’s
246
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The court was not confident of its power and ability to frame and
enforce an ejectment order, noting that “[t]here is a very real possibility
that if ejectment is ordered, many if not all of the defendants would
refuse to comply with such an order.”250 Would this be the case if the
current possessors received the monetary award the court offered the
Cayuga? What happens when large numbers of landowners are
displaced where the state takes property by eminent domain?
In the end, the court withheld specific relief because “[a]n
ejectment order would . . . strike at the very heart of what many in this
country (including no doubt the individual current possessors) strive for
years to achieve—ownership of real property.”251 Those concerns and
more weighty ones, those about sovereignty and self-determination on
the part of the Cayuga, loomed just as large by the denial of the order but
were given no consideration.252
transportation systems, and disruptions to it, with resultant negative consequences for the economy,
that the local banking industry would be especially hard-hit in terms of mortgage defaults. This
factor weighed in favor of defendants, but it was not counterbalanced by the economic and cultural
deprivation that the Cayuga have and will continue to experience. While current possessors with no
right, have enjoyed economic stability and quiet possession as a result of their apparent ownership
of the land, the Cayuga were without such economic stability and quiet enjoyment. Cayuga, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10579 at *92-94.
250
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10579 at *96.
251
Id. at *96. The court also expressed some worry about “vexatious disputes in the form of
satellite contempt proceedings—proceedings which could easily clog the federal courts well into the
next century.” Id. at *97.
252
In Chippewas v. Attorney Gen., [2000] 195 D.L.R. (4th) 135 leave to appeal dismissed,
(2001) 205 D.L.R. (4th) viii reconsideration dismissed, S.C.C.A. No. 63, 51 O.R. (3d) 641 (2001), a
court of appeals denied a request for declaratory relief. The Chippewa claimed land they said they
were the owners of despite what appeared as a sale of land to a businessman and developer with
Crown approval in 1861, the land was never formally surrendered to the Crown. Id. at 179, 197.
While the court agreed that the Chippewa’s aboriginal title to the lands in question did not pass in a
transaction not sanctioned by the Crown as required by law, it nonetheless ruled that the relief
sought did not require the return of the land from the current possessors. This was so even though
the claim was not barred by any statutory limitation periods. Id. at 213-14. Because the Chippewa
sought a declaration of rights, which is equitable and discretionary relief, it was subject to equitable
defenses, including that the Chippewa did not assert a claim to the land for 150 years. Id. at 213-14,
215, 218, 226. The court of appeals’ ruling did not apply these equitable rules formally, but as they
should have relevance given sui generis characterization of aboriginal rights. In such cases, the
court explained, the rules of the common law must be applied by analogy only. Id. at 221. While
the court was mindful of the principle of legality and the rule of law that required “a priori
consideration be given to the party whose rights have been taken, especially where the rights . . . are
as fundamental in nature as the right of aboriginal title.” Id. Nonetheless, the court stated “it is a
basic principle of [the] legal system that the right asserted by the complaining party must be
considered in relation to the rights of others. The complaining party cannot claim entitlement to the
mechanical grant of an automatic remedy without regard to the consequences to the rights of others
that might flow by reason of the complaining party’s own conduct, including . . .any delay in
asserting the claim.”[but what “rights” do holders of void title have and but how does this affect
federal policy]” Id. at 221-22. But, the court pointed out, delay alone will not defeat aboriginal
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1. Property Rules Converted
The ruling in Cayuga was that the passage of time precluded the
granting of specific relief in ejectment, but not damages. The result of
that ruling was that a liability rule would be applied to bar specific relief
to aboriginal title holders. This result is against the generally accepted
rule in every society that property rules, the right to be restored to
possession, form the norm, and liability rules, the recovery of damages
in lieu of possession, the critical exception.253 The nature of a liability
rule, that an outsider can unilaterally reassign rights, runs counter to the
reasons for protecting possession in the first place under general
property law concepts, and as to aboriginal lands, defeats federal policy.
While both sides in the property rule—liability rule debate have
made arguments that at least appeal to their respective adherents, the
debate has not been about aboriginal title. The remedy of ejectment is

claims. Here, the equitable relief sought was denied because of the Chippewa’s conduct, in
particular, that they had knowledge of the facts necessary to assert a claim more than a century and
a half earlier, but delayed. Id. at 221-22. Also, the current possessors were good faith purchasers
without notice and had relied on the apparent validity of the original grant from the Chippewa. Id.
at 224. Yet, it was still a void, not voidable, title. “They had no reason to believe the Chippewa had
any claim to the land,” and had developed the property at considerable expense. Id. at 235, 237.
The court of appeals’ ruling may be limited to its facts and the issue of the Chippewa’s right to
damages against the Crown for breach of its aboriginal rights by the same transaction was not
before the court, so it made no ruling on that point. But what result if the Chippewa had sought the
legal remedy of ejectment? Delgamuukw suggests that ejectment would be in order. It seems that
aboriginals almost always must seek a declaration of rights as a predicate for any form of relief.
The effect, then, of the court of appeals’ decision would be to preclude ejectment in all cases, or at
least subject such claims to equitable defenses, such as laches.
253
Richard A. Epstein, Symposium: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: A
Twenty-Five Year Retrospective: A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules,
106 YALE L. J. 2091, 2096 (1997). Professor Epstein states:
The simplest situation in the law of tort is one where A simply takes and keeps the
property of B. The common remedy that is allowed by all legal systems is a simple
recovery of the thing so taken, . . . in the English law by a real action for land. In some
cases, a legal system does not appear to have resources to allow the specific recovery of
the thing, so that the competence of the court is limited to an award of damages. Even
when the line is blurred, courts can use the calculation of damages to reinstitute a de
facto property rule. In the Roman law, for example, the defendant who had taken the
plaintiff’s property was given an option to keep the thing if he were prepared to pay its
value, which looks like a liability rule. But what the law gave with one hand it took back
with the other, for the value of the thing was determined by the plaintiff, who could set it
above market value, “‘without straying over the line between optimism and perjury,’”
[note omitted] under what we would call a self-assessment system. [note omitted]. This
system is designed not to get an accurate measure of value, but rather to insure by
indirection the specific recovery of the thing itself—an early preference for the property
rules.
Id. at 2096.
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integral to that concept.254 Without the in rem protection that ejectment
gives, some venture that there would be no property institution at all and
surely no aboriginal title because aboriginal title is only possession.
Ownership interests cannot exist without trespassory rules.255
Besides overlooking this essential distinction in the nature of
aboriginal compared to fee simple title, the Cayuga court also failed to
grasp the significance of the parallel enforcement regimes: as to
aboriginal title and title held by a sovereign, there is no statute of
limitations or other time bar that can operate to bar an action for the
land’s recovery, but as to fee simple title, there is. In the former, there is
the idea that a right that is not burdened by time bars, can never be lost
(unless of course in the case of aboriginal title, only with the federal
government’s permission). That a right holder may assert a claim based
upon that right at any time should preclude a defense of innocent or
reasonable reliance on the appearance of title by one who must respond
to the right holder’s claim. In the latter regime, there is a burden on the
right holder to act within a prescribed period of time. The idea is that at
some point the right may be lost, and largely by the passage of time.
That is also the theory of laches, though a showing of some negligence
to assert the right and harm to the other also is demanded by equity. The
policy in the former is to preserve the right above all, because of the
importance of that right or other large policy. In the latter, other specific
societal ends such as security of title, judicial economy, and the
productive use of land are said to justify barring the assertion of an
ancient claim based upon a right. Thus, to deny ejectment and its call
for specific legal relief is the same as applying a statute of limitations,
which cannot be done against one who is exempt. Denying ejectment
also permits alienation of property which federal policy has made
inalienable in order to ensure to its holders possession in perpetuity. By
the infirmity of inalienability, federal law is protecting the right of
254

Honoré describes ownership by a series of “standard incidents”:
1) the right to possess; 2) the right to use; 3) the right to manage; 4) the right to the
income; 5) the right to the capital; 6) the right to security; 7) the incident of
transmissibility; 8) the incident of absence of term; 9) the duty to prevent harm; 10)
liability to execution; 11) residuary character.
TONY HONORÈ, MAKING LAW BIND: ESSAYS LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL 161-92 (1987).
255
See J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 126 (1996). “The outer boundary of the
control-powers intrinsic to various kinds of ownership interests is reciprocally related to the
trespassory rules which protect them. [note omitted] Nevertheless, the internal content of the
ownership interests and the internal content of the trespassory rules are mutually independent.
These twin pillars of property institutions cannot be collapsed either one into the other. The prima
facie privileges and powers intrinsic to an ownership interest cannot be spelled out from the
trespassory rules which protect it. Id. at 129.
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possession, not its exchange or commodity value.256 The prohibition is
against alienation, not alienation without compensation.257 It was the
intent of Congress that for their sustenance and as a fitting aid to their
progress, Indian Tribes should be secure in their possession and should
actually hold and enjoy the lands.258 Because aboriginal title gives only
a right of possession and is incapable of alienation, denial of ejectment
operates to extinguish the title as effectively as an act by the sovereign.
At the same time, recognizing rights in grantees under ancient, illegal
conveyances, largely on the basis of the passage of time, vests in these
wrongful possessors a better title, fully alienable, in fee simple.
Just as much as specific relief is compelled, substitutionary relief
must be rejected, because it is inferior and unjust. Damages will not
enable the right holders to go out into the market and purchase new
aboriginal land.259 In County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and
256
Bryan, supra note 33, at 13; McNeil, supra note 94; Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010.
257
See Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413 (1912); South Carolina v. Catawba Indian
Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498 (1985). There, a federal law authorized the disposal of tribal assets and
terminated federal responsibility for the tribe and its members and it also provided that state laws
would apply to members of the tribe in the same manner that such laws applied to non-Indians. Id.
at 504. In 1980, the tribe filed an action for possession of a 225 square mile tract. Id. at 505. The
state defended on the ground that the claim was barred by the state statute of limitations. Id. The
Supreme Court ruled that the action was barred because the act removed the special federal services
and statutory protections for Indians. Id. at 510-11. The court said,
We have long recognized that, when Congress removes restraints on alienation by
Indians, state laws are fully applicable to subsequent claim. . . . These principles reflect
an understanding that congressional action to remove restraints on alienation and other
federal protections represents a fundamental change in federal policy with respect to the
Indians who are the subject of the particular legislation.
Id. at 508-09. See also Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103 (1998)
(deciding once lands held by Indians are freed by Congress of the burden of inalienability, it loses
federal protection, such as from state taxation); Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom County, 5 F.3d
1355 (9th Cir. 1993); relying on County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992).
258
See Heckman, 224 U.S. at 413 (speaking about allotment lands).
259
Cass County, 524 U.S. at 103 (holding that once lands held by Indians are freed by
Congress of the burden of inalienability, it loses federal protection, such as from state taxation);
Lummi Indian Tribe, 5 F.3d 1355 (9th Cir. 1993); relying on County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian
Nation, 502 U.S. 251. There, the Lummi Indian Tribe argued that certain fee-patented reservation
land was exempt from state taxation because it was allotted to the Tribe under a treaty rather than
under the General Allotment Act which permits such taxation. Lummi Indian Tribe, 5 F.3d at 1357.
The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that County of Yakima was not
dispositive, finding that the Supreme Court expressly declined to decide whether parcels patented
under an act other than the General Allotment Act were also taxable. Id. The Ninth Circuit
concluded that because the Court focused on the Yakima’s ability to alienate their land, rather than
on how it was allotted, if the land is alienable, it is taxable. Id. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the
well-settled principle that a state may not tax reservation lands or reservation Indians unless
Congress has “‘made its intention to [authorize state taxation] unmistakably clear.’” Id. The court
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Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,260 the Supreme Court spoke of the
correlative relationship between the prohibition on alienation of
aboriginal lands and its liability to state law burdens. While it is within
Congress’ power to grant Indian Tribes the power of voluntary sale,
while at the same time giving immunity from taxation or “forced
alienation,” such an intent by Congress would not be presumed unless it
was “clearly manifested.” In the Court’s view, “it would seem strange to
withdraw [the] protection [of the restriction on alienation] and permit the
Indian to dispose of his lands as he pleases, while at the same time
releasing it [sic] from taxation.”261 (italics added). Thus, while the
protection of aboriginal title from “forced alienation,” continues, lands
covered by that title, are not liable to state law, because to do so would
accomplish a forced alienation. Once alienated, aboriginal title is no
longer aboriginal and no concepts of tracing apply. Thus, other property
acquired with money received from a forced alienation cannot be
regarded as aboriginal title. Aboriginal land alienated with the
government’s approval and then reacquired by a Tribe is forever
alienable and so would be a Tribe’s modern land purchases held in fee
patent status, with the consequence in both cases being liability to state
law.262 The federal policy of maintaining Indian Tribes on their
aboriginal lands, unless the government abandons it, therefore, means
that no amount of monetary damages can be efficacious to remedy a
dispossession of those lands.263
2. A Calculus Skewed and Equitable Rules Inverted
Can laches be applied first to relegate a plaintiff to substitutionary
relief, then also to discount the amount of substitutionary relief
awarded? If a court determines that substitutionary and not specific

therefore concluded that the land’s alienability determined its taxability. Id. at 1358. In the Ninth
Circuit’s view, the Supreme Court held that no matter how land becomes patented, it is taxable once
restraints against alienation expire. Id. at 1359.
See also 25 U.S.C. § 357 (stating that except where specifically provided for by Congress,
aboriginal title is not subject to a state’s eminent domain power).
260
502 U.S. 251 (1992).
261
Id. at 263; see also Lummi Indian Tribe, 5 F.3d at 1357 (relying on and distinguishing
County of Yakima).
262
Lummi Indian Tribe, 5 F.3d at 1358.
263
See United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432, 444-45 (1903), where the Court ruled that “[i]t
[was] manifest that no proceedings at law [could] be . . . efficacious for the protection of the rights
of the government, . . . and thus give security against any action upon the part of the local
authorities tending to interfere with the complete control, not only of the Indians by the government,
but of the property supplied to them by the government and in use on the[ir] lands.” Id.
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relief is in order because equitable considerations preclude the latter, but
not the former, do those same equitable considerations operate to limit
the amount of substitutionary relief awarded? This occurred in Cayuga.
The jury awarded damages for “loss of use and possession of the [land]
from July 27, 1795 to date as measured by a fair rental value without
improvements” of $1.9 million.264 The court added $35 million for the
future loss of use and possession (permanent damages) and $211 million
as prejudgment interest.265 The fair rental value damages were
computed for each of the 204 years in the year those damages were
sustained and the jury did not, as instructed by the court, convert those
damages to current values.266 The jury took $3.5 million, or 10% of
what it deemed to be the current value of the property ($35 million) and
divided that by each of the 204 years.267 That calculation seemed
completely arbitrary and had the effect of overstating the compensation
in the early years and understating it in the later years because rental
values surely could not have remained constant for more than 200
years.268 The court accepted the verdict nonetheless, pointing out the
difference between a verdict that is logical and one that might be
economically consistent, the latter being an insufficient ground for
overturning a verdict.
The court held that an award of prejudgment interest was clearly
appropriate and necessary to fully compensate the Cayuga for the lost
“opportunity” cost, or time value of money, resulting from not having
the stream of rental income available to them from the property over the
past two centuries.269 Such an award is also favored by general
264

Cayuga, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 274.
Id. at 292. The United States’ expert had suggested $335 million as compensation and the
State’s expert $40 million to $62 million. Id. at 288.
266
Id. at 283.
267
Id. at 283.
268
Id. at 284.
269
The court awarded pre-judgment interest even though the Cayuga’s did not expressly seek
it. Cayuga, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 284. But under federal common law, that omission does not amount
to a waiver of the right to such and award. Id. at 284. This position is “consistent with both Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(b), freely allowing amendment to complaints . . . and . . . Rule 54 (c), allowing for the
granting of such relief in a default judgment as a party is entitled, even if the party has not
demanded such relief in the party’s pleadings.” Id. The district court found the guiding legal
principles for awarding pre-judgment interest in Wickham Contracting v. Local Union No.3, 955
F.2d 831, 834 (2d Cir. 1992): “(i) the need to fully compensate the wronged party for actual
damages suffered, (ii) considerations of fairness and the relative equities of the award, (iii) the
remedial purpose of the statute involved, and/or [for] (iv) such other general principles as are
deemed relevant by the court,” which include the certainty of the damages due the plaintiff and
whether the statute itself already provides for full compensation and punitive damages. In addition,
the “speculative nature of the damages in question will always be relevant to a sound decision on a
265
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considerations of fairness and the relative equities. But the amount of an
award would be limited in the same way the available relief was limited.
Even though the court could not fault the Cayuga for delay in bringing
the action (as it did in deciding to preclude specific relief) because of the
legal and political obstacles they faced,270 the court said it could not
ignore the passage of more that 200 years in calculating prejudgment
interest.271 Though the accrual date was determined to be July 27, 1795,
as the “date of injury or deprivation.”272 Nevertheless the court held that
considerations of fairness and equity to the state defendant, who the
court could not find had acted in perfect good faith,273 required that
interest not be computed from that date. Instead, the amount of interest
otherwise accruing was discounted by some 90%.274
The original idea of equity was specific and in personam relief
where none could be found at law. Examples of such relief include
specific performance of a contract for the sale for land, rescission of a
contract, injunctions against threatened injurious conduct. The Cayuga
court stated that ejectment was “not an adequate remedy relative to other
available remedies, most notably monetary damages,”275 thereby turning
consideration of whether prejudgment interest should be awarded.” Wickham Contracting, 955 F.2d
at 836. The district court found prejudgment interest can be awarded even when a federal statute is
silent on the issue, as is the Nonintercourse Act, so long as such awards are “fair, equitable and
necessary to compensates the wronged party fully.” Cayuga, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 285. At the same
time, where “the defendant acted innocently and had no reason to know of the wrongfulness of his
action . . . when there is a good faith dispute between the parties as to the existence of any liability,
or . . . when the plaintiff is responsible for the delay in recovery,” prejudgment interest may be
denied. Id. at 285. See generally, Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1 (2001).
270
Cayuga, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 353.
271
The court used compounded interest, due to the fact this furthered the primary goal of
prejudgment interest, which is to make the plaintiff whole again and compounding the interest was
the norm from a strictly economic perspective. Id. at 363. The court adopted a rate of one of the
economists who testified (Berkman) who used “the 3-month Treasury Bill” rate for most of the
century and during the 1800’s, used various municipal, state, and federal bonds, and between 1795
and 1797, he used the rate “associated with a loan from Holland to the American Revolutionary
government.” Id. These rates took into account changing economic conditions and therefore best
composted with the purpose of a prejudgment interest award. Id.
272
Id. at 363.
273
The court found that considering the sales price set for Cayuga land, “the State’s lack of
good faith [to be] virtually self-evident. . . .” Id. at 347. The state purchased lands for “what was
the equivalent of only 50 cents per acre, whereas those lands were to be sold by the state for no less
than the equivalent of $2.00 per acre.” Id. While the court did not find that the state was motivated
by a deliberate intent to cheat or defraud the Cayuga, “[t]here [was] more than enough proof in the
record, . . . to support a finding . . . that the State . . . did exhibit a lack of good faith in its dealings
with the Cayuga.” Id. at 349.
274
Id. at 366.
275
Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 10579 at *81 (N.D.N.Y. 1999),
citing Restatement § 937, cmt. b (“For property rights . . . , a damage award may often provide
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the analysis upside down (particularly where the Cayuga did not seek
equitable relief).
The first point to make about this is that
substitutionary relief theoretically is inadequate, at least to the extent
that damages are not equivalent to the thing lost. Additionally, the
particular award is unjust because it reflects a double penalty as the right
holders are denied possession because of delay, though their claim is not
barred by law, but they are also denied a full substitute because of that
same delay.
There is the further point that ejectment and damages serve
different ends: the former, the interest in the land per se, and the latter,
the interest in the economic value of the land. Where the thing for which
relief is sought has no commodity or exchange value, such as land
covered by aboriginal title, an award of monetary damages in
substitution for specific relief cannot be accepted as just. Moreover, in
the culture of indigenous peoples,
[T]he collective right to land means that land has a value beyond being
a commodity that is to be purchased and exchanged. The broader
value of land remains central to the lives and economies. Everything of
consequence for indigenous peoples begins with their unique
understanding of the ties between all life, the land and the seas. It is a
‘symbiotic relationship,’ a physical and spiritual unity, a seamless
whole which [cannot] be divided into parts.276

It is the lack of any specific interchangeability among things within
the indigenous peoples’ culture that demonstrates a categorization of
fungibility to goods that Westerners would not recognize, “which would
also imply that the procurement of goods for consumption is not
necessarily based on the technological production of them but is rather
related to the specific tree or fish or river or moose that is in front of
them, and for reasons that would not make sense to us. . . .”277 Only
specific relief gives indigenous peoples their due of “legal protection to
prior occupation in the present-day.”278
VII. CONCLUSION
“Property” both confers and was born of power. It bestows on an
owner a form of sovereignty over others, because the sovereign state
adequate substitutional relief.”) [But this is entirely different—the opposite—from what the court
found.]
276
VENNE, supra note 78, at 126.
277
Bryan, supra note 33, at 27-28.
278
Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 1088.
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stands behind the owner’s assertion of right. Individual property rights
thus depend on state power and when the state recognizes and enforces
one person’s property right, it simultaneously denies property rights in
others. A property owner’s security as to particular things thus comes at
the expense of others being vulnerable to the owner’s control over those
things. “Ownership, therefore, is power over persons, not merely
things.”279 Conversely, where the state does not back ownership, there
can be no property or individual sovereignty. Individual sovereignty
both assures and rests upon self-determination, a human right and also a
political one.280 Self-government is a vital political aspect of the right of
self-determination.281
The sovereignty of indigenous peoples as it rests upon aboriginal
title, though, is not a true sovereignty, because the federal government
holds the power to extinguish that title. But would the government
move to do so in the case of the Cayuga, the Seneca, and the Miami
where specific relief in ancient ejectment claims cannot fairly be denied?
An honest assessment of the historical circumstances upon which
indigenous peoples came to be dispossessed (as the High Court in
Australia in particular has done) demands that the government not do so.
Instead, any deprivation of that possession, even ancient ones, must be
limited to a discussion of restoring indigenous peoples to their lands.
279
Gregory S. Alexander, Time and Property In The American Republican Legal Culture, 66
N.Y.U. L. REV. 273, 277 (1991).
280
See Paul Joffee, Assessing the Delgamuukw Principles, 45 MCGILL L.J. 155, 182-83, 203
(2000). The Supreme Court of Canada has confirmed in the Quebec Secession Reference, [1988] 2
S.C.R. 217, that the right of self-determination ‘has developed largely as a human right.’”
281
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides:
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development.
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic cooperation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case
may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.”
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (xxI), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, Art.
1, (Dec. 19, 1966) Can. T.S. 1976 No. 47, 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force March 23, 1976,
accession by Canada May 19, 1976).
Part 1, Article 1. The Committee also recommended that the practice of extinguishing inherent
aboriginal rights be abandoned as incompatible with article 1 of the Covenant. With particular
reference to Canada in 1999, the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations has stated that it
was particularly concerned that Canada had not yet implemented the recommendations of the Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, which concluded, among other things, that without a greater
share of lands and resources, institutions of aboriginal self-government would fail. U. N. CCPR
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Human Rights Committee, 65th Canada,
[Part] C, at ¶8. UN Committee on Human Rights, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States
Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 105 at para. 8 (1999).
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As land is restored to indigenous peoples and title is confirmed in
these claimants, is it to be restored with the same burdens and limitations
that in modern life affect non-aboriginal title? In some places, the land
sought and restored are in areas thought by some to be ecologically
sensitive, fragile.282 But this concern cannot be grounds for refusing to
restore aboriginal lands. Tribal lands may be subject to some state land
use regulations,283 yet importantly, because aboriginal title’s defining
characteristic is the right of possession, in perpetuity, it provides the
foundation for the preservation of the distinct culture on which that title
is founded. But, if the specific relief of ejectment is to be denied, despite
a compelling case under law for it, the only just and principled
substitutionary relief for these ancient claims is substitute aboriginal
land. That is to say, land denominated sovereign and free from the
burdens of state.
282
Dave Cunningham, “Race-based riches: A study finds the Nisga’a template will give
indians one-fifth of BC’s timber,” CANADIAN BUSINESS AND CURRENT AFFAIRS, BRITISH
COLUMBIA REPORT, Oct. 5, 1998, available at http://www.lexis.com.
Concerns about
environmentally threatening uses were raised after the making of the Nisga’a treaty. Id. One
journal reported on the results of a study showing that “if the Nisga’a treaty is used as a template for
the 50 other treaties under negotiation, it would darken B.C.’s [British Columbia’s] economic
climate dramatically and give 3% of the province’s population 20% of its timber.” Id. Under the
treaty, the Nisga’a have title to “1,930 square kilometres of . . . land[] including a timber base able
to sustain an annual allowable cut (AAC) of 165,000 cubic metres for the first five years, dropping
to 135,000 cubic metres thereafter.” Id. In addition, Nisga’a have the “right to “‘co-manage’ the
1.6-million-hectare Nass Wildlife Area, roughly eight times the size of their settlement lands. This
includes a 50% vote in all land-use decisions that may affect fish and wildlife—in particular,
logging, mining and hunting.” Id. An additional 165,000 cubic metres of timber in the Nass
Timber Supply Area, means (according to one analyst), [“the total Nisga’a [annual allowable cut]
could easily top 500,000 cubic metres, taken primarily from licences now held by governmentowned Skeena Cellulose. Given a Nisga’a population of 5,500, 3.7% of B.C.’s Indian population, a
quick calculation suggests that if the treaty is used as a template, B.C. Indians will have harvesting
rights of 13.5 million cubic metres, 19% of the total provincial crown forest [annual allowable
cut].”] Id. “A similar extrapolation of Nisga’a wildlife management rights indicates B.C. Indians
will control and co-manage 49 million hectares-one-half of the entire province.” Id. “‘Every timber
licence renewal, cut-block permit, access road, harvesting system, silviculture regime and habitat
treatment in the Nass Wildlife Area will require the approval of Indian co-managers.’” Id.
283
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905). The Court stated [in dicta] that a state
could regulate Native American fishing rights for conservation purposes. Id. That dicta became the
holding in Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942). There, the State of Washington charged and
convicted a Yakima Indian of netting salmon off the reservation without a fishing license. Id. at
682. The defendant argued that the licensing requirement violated the Indians’ fishing rights under
treaty. Id. The Court ruled that the state could regulate the “time and manner of fishing outside the
reservation as . . . necessary for the conservation of fish.” Id. at 684. The state could not, however,
charge a fee for the license, since it was “not indispensable to the effectiveness of a state
conservation program,” but it impermissibly limited a federal right. Id. at 685; see also Puyallup
Tribe v. Washington, 391 U.S. 392 (1968); Washington v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973);
Puyallup v. Washington, 433 U.S. 165 (1977) (all three decisions upholding state’s reasonable
regulations to the extent necessary for conservation).
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